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THE UNITED STATES POST OFFICE, 
INCORPORATED: A BLUEPRINT 
FOR REFORM 
Stanley Siegel* 
FOR several generations, the United States Post Office has been the textbook demonstration of the inefficiency of the gov-
ernment in business. To some, the solution to its problems lies only 
in turning over its functions to free enterprise. A more constructive 
and politic approach is to inquire whether a structural arrangement 
falling somewhere between that of a governmental department and 
that of a privately owned business would permit the Post Office to 
achieve some of the efficiencies of private enterprise without com-
promising the most essential elements of public responsibility. This 
approach has been given new timeliness by the proposal of Post-
master General O'Brien to convert the Post Office into a public 
corporation. 
It is hardly surprising that the Founding Fathers did not establish 
the Post Office as a public corporation. Even as a device for the ac-
cumulation and management of private wealth, the corporation was 
then in its infancy. Since that day, the United States has witnessed 
not only the development of large private corporations to perform 
public service functions-the railroads, power companies, and tele-
phone companies-but has also gained experience with public cor-
porations such as the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). This ex-
perience has been complemented by developments in other nations, 
such as Great Britain, in the use and management of public corpo-
rations. 
Through all this accumulation of experience and administrative 
science, the United States Post Office has slumbered like an en-
chanted princess in the outdated mold of its eighteenth century 
creation. It is the purpose of this article to inquire into the deficien-
cies of the Post Office and to consider whether a basic structural 
change would permit it to fulfill more completely and more effi-
ciently its critical functions. 
Complaints about the Post Office Department are as diffuse as 
they are frequent and strident. Criticism cannot be sharpened, and 
ordered attempts at reorganization are not possible, without a clear 
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understanding of the Department's present problems and the roots 
of these problems.1 
It is fair to say that at least in recent years some progress has been 
made in most areas of the Department's operations. More mail is 
moved2 than at any previous time in its history.3 Mechanization has 
proceeded, wages have been increased, and steps have been initiated 
to infuse top-level talent into the Department. To some extent these 
innovations arise out of earlier studies of the Post Office, such as the 
1949 and 1955 Hoover Commission Reports,4 but to a significant de-
gree they represent delayed responses to the pressures of increasing 
size and complexity of operations. Recent events, such as the catas-
trophic tie-up in the Chicago Post Office, 5 demonstrate that these re-
sponses have been inadequate. Mail volume is increasing at a rate of 
over three billion pieces annually; it is estimated that the volume in 
fiscal year 1968 will be some 415 pieces per capita.6 Postmaster Gen-
eral Lawrence O'Brien has claimed that the Department is in a "race 
with catastrophe";7 that the Post Office will be incapable of dealing 
with its future demand unless massive changes are instituted. The 
major problems will be detailed below under three headings: Per-
sonnel and Organization, Finance, and Operations. 
I. PROBLEMS OF THE POST OFFICE 
A. Personnel and Organization 
As of June 30, 1966, the Post Office had over 675,000 employees; 
employment statistics indicate larger increases of the work force each 
I. As of 1962, "the whole of the scholarly literature on the Post Office comprise[d] 
just six doctoral dissertations •••• " M. BARATZ, THE ECONOMICS OF TilE PosrAL SERVICE 
I (1962). 
2. Present volume is eighty-three billion pieces of mail annually. Hearings on Post 
Office Appropriations Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 90th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House]. 
The mail moves through 44,000 post offices, stations and branches. Id. at 402-03. 
3. A British study suggests that the real cost of transporting mail has declined, but 
no studies in the United States establish this hypothesis. Compare I SELECT CoM-
MI.TI'EE ON NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES, FIRST REPORT-THE Posr OFFICE 61 (1967) [here-
inaner cited as SELECT COMMI.TI'EE REPORT]. 
4. COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF TilE GOVERNMENT, 
THE Posr OFFICE DEPARTMENT, and other reports (1949) [hereinafter cited as 1949 
HOOVER COMMISSION]; COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF TilE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF TilE 
GoVERNMENT, PERSONNEL AND CIVIL SERVICE, and other reports (1955) [hereinafter cited 
as 1955 HOOVER COMMISSION]. 
5. Remsberg, The Day the Mails Stopped, SATURDAY REv., Dec. 17, 1966, at 21. 
6. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 28. Approximately 80% of all mail and 
75% of all first-class mail is business mail. Id. at 54-55. Moreover, mail is heavily 
concentrated at certain times and places. It is estimated that a billion pieces of mail 
are handled by New York City's General Post Office during the Christmas period. This 
is more than the total annual mail of Belgium, and as much as that of France. N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 6, 1967, at 41, col. 5. 
7. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 4; Cordtz, It's Now or Never for the Post 
Office, FORTUNE, March 1967, at 134. 
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year.8 It is a bottom-heavy labor force: clerks, mail handlers, carriers, 
drivers, and maintenance personnel constituted 402,000 of the total, 
and substitute employees in these positions9 comprised an additional 
201,000. Pay grades among this group range from PFS-1 through 
PFS-6, a salary range of $4,324 to $8,680.1° Fewer than 100,000 posi-
tions in the entire postal service are above the postal clerk and letter-
carrier category.11 
At the lower levels, the problems of attracting and retaining 
employees are significant, for rather obvious reasons. Pay rates are 
uniform nationwide; thus, while Post Office positions are desirable 
in areas of low living costs, it is difficult if not impossible to attract 
prospects of similar quality to Post Office positions in major urban 
centers, where costs of living and competing opportunities together 
render postal salaries unattractive.12 Moreover, new employees begin 
8. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL-FINANCIAL SUPPLEMENT 38, 80 
(1966). 
9. Authorized by 39 U.S.C. § 3302 (1964). 
10. 39 U.S.C. § 3542 (Supp. II 1965-1966) (pay scale). Under a postal rate and federal 
salaries bill signed by the President in December 1967, postal field service salaries were 
increased 6% retroactive to October 1, 1967, and will be increased another 5% on 
July 1, 1968. H.R. 7977, § 3542, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). See S. REP. No. 801, 90th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1967). The cited figures are effective July 1, 1968. 85% of all 
postal workers are in the bottom five grades. Cordtz, supra note 7, at 136. 
11. S. REP. No. 801, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1967). 
12. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 24, 430-31. See, e.g., the statement of the 
President of the National Association of Letter Carriers concerning low entrance salaries 
in New York City. Id. at 728. The 1955 Hoover Commission noted that postal pay 
classifications were too detailed and elaborate and that they did not respond to varying 
regional pay rates. 1955 HOOVER COMMISSION, PERSONNEL AND CIVIL SERVICE 54-57. Al-
though there is authority for the Civil Service Commission to establish higher minimum 
wages, within limits, if area wages are so substantially above the pay rates of statutory 
pay schedules as to handicap significantly the Government's recruitment or retention 
of well-qualified individuals, this authority appears to have been sparsely used-if at _ 
all-in the postal service. 5 U.S.C. § 5303 (Supp. II 1965-1966). See, e.g., the testimony 
of Congressman William Ford of Michigan: 
I have spent some time looking at the wage policies of the American Telephone 
&: Telegraph Co. They have a very sophisticated regional wage scale system that 
they have worked out over a period of years. 
Now, I have heard it said around the Hill since I came here a couple of years 
ago that the reason we don't try to do this with Federal employees is because 
the employee organizations have opposed it. 
If they have opposed it vigorously, I don't know what proposal they might 
have opposed, because in preparation for these hearings I have checked back, 
and found that in the past 4 years the administration in none of its proposals 
has suggested any such plan. 
[F]rankly, I don't know of a single post office in my district that doesn't have 
more positions authorized than it has people to fill them .••• 
It seems unfortunate that we should be building toward a service that is 
growing as fast or faster, in the demand that the public is making on it, than 
anything in our entire economy •••. [Y]et we are not anticipating the tremendous 
demands that will be made on it by doing something realistic about recruiting and 
keeping the kind of people who can be trained for the more sophisticated 
machinery that this committee is talking about making available. 
Hearings on H.R. 8261 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Compensation 
of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 90-15, at 
53-54 (1967). 
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as substitutes, with no assurance of a full week's work and pay, and 
often with undesirable night shifts.13 
Once in the postal service, employees receive little training and 
have remarkably few opportunities to progress to higher grades or 
greater responsibilities. Four out of five postal employees remain in 
the same grade throughout their careers, receiving periodic salary in-
creases within that grade; they have little motivation to excel.14 
Moreover, it has frequently been claimed, though not well docu-
mented, that the giving of promotions at even the lowest grades is 
affected by political considerations.15 
In technical positions, as well as at the managerial and executive 
levels, these problems are at least as severe. Until quite recently, little 
effort was made to hire college graduates for managerial positions. 
Efforts to attract such people, as well as professional talent-engi-
neers, attorneys, and the like-have been hampered by low salaries, 
unattractive working conditions, 16 and the suspicion that political 
considerations affect advancement.17 A pilot program was recently 
initiated to develop a cadre of trained supervisors; this operates in 
conjunction with a project that for the first time permits volun-
tary transfers of employees from one post office to another for ex-
perience and advancement.18 Since, however, postmasters are polit-
Regional pay variation, however, is an issue of considerable union concern, and 
many employee organizations do not favor such a policy. Cf. SELECT COMMITIEE REPORT 
36, 38 (union objections to local pay differentials in Great Britain). 
13. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 73, 338-41, 754. Turnover among such 
substitutes is high. 
14. See Cordtz, supra note 7, at 136-37. 
15. See, e.g., the statement of the President of the National Postal Union in 1968 
Appropriations Hearings-House 756; Cordtz, supra note 7, at 137; Greenfield, What's 
the Matter With the Mails, REPORTER, Feb. 11, 1965, at 21, 24. 
16. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 321, 701, 715, 722-23. Rigidity of the 
civil service promotion scheme makes it difficult to retain professionals. Id. at 682. 
17. Id. at 69-70. Note the following rather strained exchange: 
Mr. Robison •••• Isn't one of your problems, Mr. Postmaster General, in at-
tracting talent, young talent, from the college university campuses and so on that 
political overstructure that tends to inhibit career advancement, at least at the 
top levels of the Post Office? 
Mr. O'Brien. I am not sure, Mr. Robison, that in general management, head-
quarters, regional, across this country that we have restrictions imposed upon us 
along these lines. Perhaps there are occasions. I am trying to recall now but I 
I can't-any specifics. 
18. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 361. The Department has had a year of 
favorable experience with a management intern program, and it plans for 1968 to 
initiate a Postal Staff Institute. Id. at 341-42, 367-68. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER 
GENERAL 143-44 (1966). 
It may prove surprising to those unfamiliar with the Post Office that lateral trans• 
fers have generally been forbidden from one post office to another. But see 39 U.S.C. 
§ 3332 (1964) (permitting transfers to branches). Mr. O'Brien describes the voluntary 
transfer arrangement as "unprecedented." 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 7. In 
fairness to the Department, it should be noted that labor generally opposes such 
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ical appointees, the advancing Post Office employee who is without 
political influence faces a substantial impediment to his further 
progress.19 While it is true that in all government departments 
political considerations enter into promotions at the highest levels, 
under present policies the top 25,000 jobs in the Post Office are 
filled by presidential appointment;20 and, from 1960 to 1967, nearly 
two-thirds of the new postmaster appointments were drawn from 
outside the ranks of postal employees.21 That some of these outside 
appointees prove to be excellent postmasters is clear; it is equally 
clear, however, that many do not, and even more obvious that the 
appointment process produces a grave morale problem.22 Objec-
tions to the political appointment of postmasters have been voiced 
since at least the 1949 Hoover Commission Report, which recom-
mended generally that "the Post Office should be taken out of pol-
itics,'' and specifically that confirmation of postmasters by the Sen-
ate be abolished.23 A task force of the 1955 Hoover Commission 
concluded that political selection of postmasters "is incompatible 
with a businesslike management of the largest civilian business that 
the Government operates," and recommended that postmasters be 
named by the Postmaster General without Senate confirmation.24 
This recommendation, however, was never adopted by the Com-
mission itself; it remained for subsequent legislative proposals to 
transfers, even on a voluntary basis; for example, they oppose the pilot project on 
voluntary transfers. Id. at 68. 
19. Postmasters of first-, second•, and third-class post offices are appointed by the 
President, with Senate confirmation. 39 U.S.C. § 331l(a) (1964). The formal procedure 
calls for written or oral examinations to be given by the Civil Service Commission, with 
the top three eligibles certified to the Postmaster General, who in turn recommends 
one for appointment by the President. But in fact, an "advisor," usually the local 
Congressman of the party in power, transmits the choice of local party leaders to the 
Postmaster General. Indeed, if the chosen man does not qualify on the examination, 
a new examination may be scheduled. NATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE LEAGUE, POUCY STATE• 
MENT: ABANDONING PATRONAGE IN POSTAL APPOINTMENTS (1966). Patronage rights of 
Senators and Congressmen are a matter of record not only as to appointment of post• 
masters, but also as to appointments in regional offices of the Post Office. See Hearings 
on Nomination of Lawrence F. O'Brien To Be Postmaster General of the United States 
Before the Senate Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1965). 
20. As of June !JO, 1966, 24,720 postmaster positions were subject to presidential 
appointment. 8,401 fourth-class postmaster positions are filled by appointment of the 
Postmaster General under !!9 u.s.c. § !l!lll(b) (1964). ANNUAL REPORT OF THE POST· 
MASI"ER GENERAL-FINANCIAL SUPPLEMENT 44-45 (1966). 
21. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 49. 
22. Id. at 48-50, !!54-55. Note that the postmaster position can be filled temporarily 
by the naming of an acting postmaster, !!9 U.S.C. § !!315 (1964), and that this process 
has been used to allow an otherwise unqualified candidate to qualify himself for 
office. Id. at 164-66; NATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE LEAGUE, supra note 19. 
2!!. 1949 HOOVER CoMMISSION, THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT 9-10. 
24. 1955 HOOVER COMMISSION, REPORT OF TASK FORCE ON PERSONNEL AND CIVIL .SER-
VICE 133-35. 
620 Jl.1ichigan Law Review [Vol. 66:615 
advance this approach.25 Despite these proposals, renewed with in-
creasing frequency, the original appointment process remains. 
Incompetent employees pose yet another problem: adverse per-
sonnel actions are long and drawn-out. The average processing 
time for an appeal is nearly two months,26 during which time the 
employee stays on the rolls-often as a genuine impediment to 
local operations-despite the fact that the Board of Appeals and 
Review sustains the adverse action in about eighty-five per cent of 
its cases. 27 
A problem endemic to the entire Department is lack of indi-
vidual authority: from the Postmaster General down, executives, 
managers, supervisors, and workers are so hamstrung by statutory 
and regulatory restrictions that they are left with too little discre-
tion to perform their jobs well.28 Witness the following exchange 
between Congressman Steed and Postmaster General O'Brien: 
Mr. Steed. General, in some degree by matters beyond anybody's 
control and in some degree by act of the Congress and by other 
legal requirements, would this be a fair summary: that at the present 
time, as the manager of the Post Office Department, you have no 
control over your workload, you have no control over the rates of 
revenue, you have no control over the pay rates of the employees 
that you employ, you have very little control over the conditions 
of the service of these employees, you have virtually no control, by 
the nature of it, of your physical facilities, and you have only a 
limited control, at best, over the transportation facilities that you 
are compelled to use-all of which adds up to a staggering amount 
of "no control" in terms of the duties you have to perform. . . . 
Mr. O'Brien. Mr. Chairman, I would have to generally agree with 
your premise certainly. I must say that is a staggering list of "no 
control." I don't know it has ever been put that succinctly to me. 
If it had been at an appropriate time, perhaps I wouldn't be sit-
ting here.29 
Postmasters, like the Postmaster General, also suffer from a lack of 
authority; although, for example, additional purchasing authority 
was delegated to the postal region in 1966, the procurement author-
ity of local postmasters remains small.30 A task force of the 1949 Hoo-
ver Commission reported that lack of authority and the correspond-
25. See text accompanying note 83 infra. 
26. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 357 (57 days). 
27. ld. at 331. 
28. See generally Greenfield, supra note 15. 
29. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 27-28. 
30. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL 117 (1966). Note, for example, the 
case of a lost lock box key that ultimately was resolved in the office of the Postmaster 
General. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 259. 
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ing diminution of accountability have produced a philosophy of 
postal management that is "sluggish, irresolute, and wasteful, rather 
than imaginative, decisive, and cost conscious." Efforts at improve-
ment have accordingly been uninspired, low-gear, and, by compar-
ison with private industry, generally mediocre.31 
B. Finance 
The most often-voiced complaint as to finances is that despite 
rate increases in all classes of mail, postal deficits increase annu-
ally. 32 Financial problems begin with the preparation of the budget, 
estimates for which are assembled locally some fifteen months before 
the beginning of the fiscal year, an average of some two years before 
funds are actually spent. Enactment of the Post Office budget has 
generally preceded the beginning of the fiscal year. Postal revenues 
are paid directly into the Post Office Fund in the Treasury; Congress 
annually appropriates this fund plus an additional amount to cover 
the projected deficit, and the total is then usable directly to pay Post 
Office expenses.33 Supplemental appropriations to cover unexpected 
increases in volume or wages have usually been passed without diffi-
culty; they are occasionally made necessary by budget cuts imposed 
earlier in the regular budgetary process. Appropriations are pres-
ently in six categories; the largest of these, some eighty per cent of 
the total appropriation, is that devoted to operations. Ten per 
cent is spent on transportation, and the remainder for administra-
tion, research and development, building occupancy, and plant and 
equipment.34 Transfer benveen appropriations not in excess of five 
31. 1949 HOOVER COMMISSION, TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE POST OFFICE 32-34. Note 
the comparable conclusion of the British investigation with respect to detailed Par-
liamentary control. SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT 194. 
















$ 942 million 
1204 million 
492 million 
• Including an estimated $700 million revenues from rate increases. 1968 Appro-
priations Hearings-House 107. 
It is contemplated that the costs of "public services" will be assumed directly by the 
federal government. 39 U.S.C. § 2302(c)(3) (1964). These costs, listed in 39 U.S.C. § 2303 
(1964), include such items as reduced rates for second-class mailings, free postage on 
reading matter for the blind, reduced third-class rates for charitable organizations, 
and certain other free mailing privileges. 
33. 39 U.S.C. § 2202 (1964). See, e.g., Post Office Department Appropriation Act, 81 
Stat. 115 (1967). 
34. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 98. In 1968 a seventh appropriation was 
622 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 66:615 
per cent is permitted when authorized by the appropriation act;85 
and expenditure in excess of the appropriation is prohibited by the 
Anti-Deficiency law.36 
This entire budgetary process, at least as applied to the Post 
Office, has tended to misdirect efforts that might otherwise have 
been spent on seeking cost effectiveness to assuring legality and 
securing appropriate approvals for the expenditure of appropriated 
funds. The process is unresponsive to genuine Post Office needs, 
and it is occasionally subject to political influences wholly uncon-
cerned with postal operations.37 It was recognized nearly twenty 
years ago that despite the liberalizing influences of freely available 
supplemental appropriations and the ability to spend postal re-
ceipts, the postal budget merely created the appearance of flexibil-
ity, while the real effect was to produce rigidity of control within 
the department rather than the flexibility of financial operations 
necessary to a rapidly changing, essentially commercial activity.38 
Yet the Post Office has only recently initiated financial controls 
based to some degree on performance. The new Planning-Program-
ming-Budgeting System89 is not yet used, however, in preparing 
budget presentations to Congress. Congress therefore has little mean-
ingful data for evaluating the financial effectiveness of the Depart-
ment. 
A second area of concern, operational as well as financial, is 
approval of capital expenditures, including not only acquisitions 
of post office buildings but purchases of machinery and equipment 
added for postal public buildings, to be constructed by the Post Office Department for 
the first time pursuant to a delegation of authority from the General Services Admin• 
istration. Id. at 518-20. In an earlier period, Post Office appropriations were under fifty• 
eight separate headings. This came under sharp attack. 1949 HOOVER COMMISSION, THE 
Posr OFFICE DEPARTMENT 11. 
35. 39 U.S.C. § 2201 (Supp. II 1965-1966). This transfer authority was excluded 
from the 1968 Appropriation Act. Post Office Department Appropriation Act, 81 Stat. 
115 (1967). 
36. 31 u.s.c. § 665 (1964). 
37. For example, the House attempt, in the context of cost-cutting associated with 
the proposed 1968 tax increase, to cut postal spending to the point where the Depart-
ment might have been forced to adopt drastic reductions in services. Wall Street Jour-
nal, Oct. 18, 1967, at 2, col. 3. For an example of rate lobbying that backfired, how-
ever, see Wall Street Journal, Dec. 6, 1967, at 6, col. 2. See generally Greenfield, supra 
note 15, at 22-23. 
38. 1949 HOOVER COMMISSION, TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE Posr OFFICE Ill. 
39. This is a system of long-term program planning that has been adapted from 
one in use by the Department of Defense. See, e.g., Hearings on Postal Modernization 
Before the Subcomm. on Postal Facilities and Modernization of the House Comm. on 
Post Office and Civil Service, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 90-17, pt. 1, at 19-20 (1967). 
Budget estimates to the Bureau of the Budget were presented on a program basis as 
well as the traditional appropriation basis in 1967. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER 
GENERAL 142-44 (1967). 
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as well. A major Post Office problem, the construction of multi-
purpose buildings to house post offices in accordance with General 
Service Administration (GSA) plans, has recently been solved in 
large measure through a delegation of construction authority from 
the GSA to the Post Office Department.40 However, many problems 
still remain: so heavily do the political patronage process and bud-
getary delays enter into building construction that many years 
elapse after submission of a request before a new post office is 
erected. And, despite the existence of sophisticated . and effective 
mechanized devices for sorting and moving mail-such as the multi-
position letter sorting machine41-many major postal centers, includ-
ing New York and Baltimore, have done without these machines 
for years and even now do not have them. While it is true that 
some recently publicized devices, such as the experimental optical 
scanner in operation in Detroit,42 may yet be unproven and not 
available for general use, many other devices as effective and trouble-
free as conveyor belts have not yet been generally infused into the 
system. One may well conclude that querulous claims of the oper-
ationally unproved reliability and safety of new machines should 
be treated with skepticism, 43 and that delays in the development 
and introduction of new machinery are more traceable to fiscal 
limitations than to questions concerning the effectiveness of the 
machinery. Postmaster General O'Brien, in rate increase hear-
ings, noted the wide disparity between capital expenditures of the 
American Telephone and Telegraph Company, which devotes more 
than one-third of its annual revenue to capital expenditures, and 
the Post Office, which allocates only two per cent of its budget 
thereto.44 A portion of this difference may be attributable to dif-
ferences in the operations of the two enterprises, but the point 
should not be obscured that private industry has shown far greater 
readiness to make substantial capital investments where increased 
business or more effective operations are at stake. 
40. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 8, 519-20 (text of delegation). 
41. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PoSTJIIASTER GENERAL 47 (1966). 
42. Id. at 68-70. The latest listing of postal modernization by city and type of equip-
ment appears in Hearings on Postal Modernization Before the Subcomm. on Postal 
Facilities and Modernization of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 
90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 90-17, pt. 1, at 42-43 (1967). 
43. See, e.g., SELEcr COJIIMITTEE REPORT 45. 
44. Hearings on the Postal Revenue Act of 1967 Before the Subcomm. on Postal 
Rates of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 
90-14, at 16, 27 (1967). The first trace of postal modernization was not evident until 
1955. Hearings on Postal Modernization Before the Subcomm. on Postal Facilities and 
Modernization of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess,, ser. 90-17, pt. I, at 28-30 (1967). 
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Ratemaking is the third financial headache. The Post Office 
cannot regulate the demand for its services, and the Postmaster 
General has authority to set rates on only special services, inter-
national mail, and parcel post, the latter only with Interstate Com-
merce Commission consent and on a nondeficit basis. Rates on first-, 
second-, and third-class mail are determined by Congress, theoret-
ically in accordance with the general mandates of the Postal Policy 
Act.45 The Department's Cost Ascertainment System shows that in 
fiscal year 1967, first-class mail produced a revenue surplus of $116 
million; all other mail produced deficits-second-class, $416 mil-
lion; third-class, $401 million; and fourth-class, $98 million.46 
While it is contemplated that some services, such as mailings 
of nonprofit organizations, will not cover their full costs, these 
deficits have been greater than the so-called "public services costs."47 
Cost ascertainment, however, is at best an estimate; since most 
postal costs are common costs shared in some degree by all classes 
of mail, much depends on the postulates of the costing system. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, the Cost Ascertainment System has been 
called into question.48 A particular point of contention has been 
the extent to which third-class mail ( often called "junk mail") pays 
its way.49 It has been suggested that third-class mail not only fails 
to pay its totally allocated average costs, but even fails to cover its 
marginal costs.50 Perhaps the introduction of computer work mea-
surement51 will allow more precise measurement of costs on each 
of several costing postulates, but the setting of postal rates still re-
mains a matter for Congress, not the Department, to evaluate. Al-
though many will argue that postal rates are matters of essential 
public policy properly entrusted only to Congress, it is not impos-
sible to conceive of a rate schedule set by the Postmaster General, 
subject to approval by Congress, much in the manner of a public 
utility rate approved by a regulatory commission.52 This rate sched-
45. 39 u.s.c. §§ 2301-04 (1964). 
46. Hearings on the Postal Revenue Act of 1967 Before the Subcomm. on Postal 
Rates of the House Comm. on the Post Office and Civil Service, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 
ser. 90-14, at 29 (1967). 
47. See note 32 supra. 
48. The Cost Ascertainment System is subject to the major criticism that it reflects 
fully allocated costs without regard to differences in the type of service rendered for 
each class of mail. See M. BARATZ, THE ECONOMICS OF THE POSTAL SERVICE 35-39 (1962). 
49. See text accompanying note 229 infra. 
50. BARATZ, supra note 48, at 42-43. 
51. See ANNUAL RFPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL 53-55 (1966). 
52. Both Congress and the Department have considered such an approach. 1968 
Appropriations Hearings-House 52-53. The British view is that rates should be set by 
the Post Office if it is to operate on a sound commercial basis. SELEcr Cm,rnITTEE RE-
PORT 62-63. 
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ule could, of course, make provision for subsidized rates where ap-
propriate. 53 As it presently stands, however, the rate-making process 
is another area of "no control" for the Department. 
C. Operations 
To the using public, the operational problems are obvious and 
easily stated: delays, lost mail, insufficient pickup and delivery ser-
vice. As might be expected, expansion of the system without com-
pensating modernization has exacerbated these problems. What re-
mains amazing is the small percentage of complaints about postal 
service generally, possibly explained in part by the predisposition of 
users simply not to complain.54 
Few would argue that operations cannot be improved. It is im-
portant to recognize, however, the existence of certain limitations 
endemic to the job. Post Office operations are labor-intensive and 
will probably remain so notwithstanding improved technology. Of 
the three major operations-pickup, sorting, and delivery-only the 
second shows immediate promise of substantial manpower savings 
through mechanization.55 To be sure, some devices have cut man-
power demands in both pickup (for example, mail chutes) and 
delivery (for example, Vertical Improved Mailing),56 but increases 
in mail volume more than offset the manpower saved by mecha-
nization. Thus, postal costs will rise as labor costs increase with 
the cost of living; it has been suggested, however, that the financial 
savings from those machines that are introduced can be expected 
to be rather high.57 
A major issue in operations, then, is the extent to which re-
search will be pursued and the degree to which products of that 
research will be introduced into the system. Here, as we have al-
ready noted, the problem is essentially financial: expenditures for 
research have been inadequate, and the introduction of even proven 
devices has been slow. The recent creation of a new position, Assis-
tant Postmaster General for Research and Engineering, and the 
establishment of a Research and Engineering Advisory Council58 
reflect a change in attitude, but it remains to be seen whether Con-
53. "Public services costs" are recognized by 39 U.S.C. § 2303 (1964). These costs are 
listed separately as part of the net operating loss for the year. See note 32 supra. 
5·1. Cordtz, supra note 7, at 136. But see 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 
19-20. 
55. SELECT COMIIITITEE REPORT 43-44; Cordtz, supra note 7, at 195-96. 
56. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE POSTl\rASTER GENERAL 41-44 (1966). 
57. See SELECT COMIIITITEE REPORT 44, 51-52. 
58. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 8. 
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gress can appropriate-and the Post Office can spend-at a rate 
necessary to assure effective modernization. The job is a big one: 
nearly all of the seventy-five largest post offices, handling half of 
the nation's mail, were built near railroad stations at a time when 
10,000 trains daily hauled the mail. Today, with only 700 trains in 
mail service, many of these buildings are badly located for trans-
porting mail by truck or air. Moreover, many of them cannot be 
modified to accept heavy and bulky mechanized equipment.159 The 
Postmaster General has estimated that an optimum modernization 
plan would cost $5 billion within the coming five years.60 
Other operational problems derive from the excessive control 
exercised by Congress. In 1949, over 900 pages of laws and regula-
tions circumscribed Post Office operations, tending to favor "oper-
ation of the Postal Service as an expensive arm of the Government, 
rather than as the revolving fund service which it actually is.''61 
Detailed control over minor matters deprived the Post Office of 
the flexibility essential to meet changing commercial conditions. 62 
Matters have changed little since then, as a few illustrations will 
show. Although substantial savings can often be effected by ship-
ping some mail through freight forwarders or common carr1ers 
by truck, the Post Office has difficulty in using these means where 
rail service is available, even when it is more expensive. 63 In a 
related area, though it has been established that Post Offices must 
have access to highways and air terminals, more often than not 
they are still erected in town squares to satisfy local political de-
mands. 
These are the problems in brief, and while it is clear that only 
recently have they been brought widely to the public's attention, 
it is also true that Congress and the Department have addressed 
59. Cordtz, It's Now or Never for the Post Office, FORTUNE, March 1967, at 136; 
O'Brien, The Other Side of the Postal Story, U.S. NEWS &: WoRLD REPORT, Dec. 18, 
1967, at 54; Remsberg, The Day the Mails Stopped, SATURDAY REV., Dec. 17, 1966, at 22. 
60. Hearings on Postal Modernization Before the Subcomm. on Postal Facilities and 
Modernization of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess., ser. 90-17, pt. 1, at 34-35 (1967). 
61. 1949 HOOVER COMMISSION, THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT 3, 14-15. 
62. Id. This detailed control, for essentially political motives unrelated to the De-
partment's operations, dates from the Department's origins. See generally W. RICH, 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES POST OFFICE TO THE YEAR 1829 127-36 (1924); D. 
ROPER, THE UNITED STATES POST OFFICE 309-1!! (1917). 
63. Formal advertisement of contracts for transportation of mail is required by 41 
U.S.C. § 5 (1964). Contracts with railroads, however, may be made without formal 
advertising pursuant to 39 U.S.C. § 6215 (1964). The complexities and delays of formal 
advertising interfere with on-the-spot exercise of discretion in the choice of transporta• 
tion modes as loads vary. See 39 C.F.R. § 521.3 (1967). Indeed, 39 U.S.C. § 6402a (1964) 
was passed to allow negotiated contracts with bus-lines, because advertising proved im-
possible. S. REP. No. 756, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). 
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them before. The history of congressional reform efforts does not 
afford great hope for the future. 
II. THE FUTILITY OF PRIOR REFORM EFFORTS 
The most recent comprehensive effort to reform the Post Office 
followed the 1949 Hoover Commission findings on the Department. 
An immediate result of the entire Hoover Commission Report was 
the passage of the Reorganization Act of 1949,64 the purpose of 
which was to facilitate reorganization of the executive agencies 
through submission of reorganization plans by the President. 65 The 
Act authorizes the President to deliver reorganization plans to both 
houses of Congress, and provides that any such plan shall ~ake effect 
and be printed in the Statutes at Large if neither house, within sixty 
days, passes a resolution disfavoring the plan.66 One of the earliest 
plans thus delivered was Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1949,67 which 
addressed a few of the most significant problems unearthed by the 
Hoover Commission Report on the Post Office. It centralized au-
thority over the Department in the Postmaster General for the first 
time; previously the Assistant Postmasters General had specifically 
delegated areas of authority over which the Postmaster General had 
no control. In addition, the Plan authorized the Postmaster General 
to delegate his authority. 68 It established a Deputy Postmaster Gen-
eral, three Assistant Postmasters General, and a Postal Advisory 
Board, as recommended by the Hoover Commission. 69 Finally, the 
Plan abolished the separate Bureau of Accounts of the Post Office 
Department and the Office of the Purchasing Agent for the Post Of-
fice Department.70 All this was done, as the accompanying message 
from President Truman noted, as "an important first step in strength-
ening the organization of the Post Office Department." 
It was not much more than a first step, and a tentative step 
at that. So, although the Hoover Commission had recommended 
that the President appoint an experienced executive, preferably 
from within the Postal Service, to serve without term as a Director 
of Posts under the Postmaster General,11 the Plan specified neither 
64. 5 U.S.C. §§ 901-13 (Supp. II 1965-1966). 
65. See H.R. REP. No. 23, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. I (1949). 
66. 5 U.S.C. §§ 903, 906 (Supp. II 1965-1966). 
67. 63 Stat. 1066 (1949); 5 U.S.C. § 133z-15 (Note) (1964). 
68. Section I. 
69. Sections 2-4. 
70. Section 5. 
71. The title was changed to Deputy Postmaster General in Reorganization Plan 
No. 3. 
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term nor qualifications. The fault lay to some extent with the 
Reorganization Act, which requires that any appointment not under 
the classified civil service be made by the President, with Senate 
confirmation. Moreover, the term of office can be fixed at no greater 
period than four years. Indeed, as noted earlier, the Hoover Com-
mission made no suggestion to eliminate this appointment process 
as to the Postmaster General or the proposed Director of Posts.72 
However, in addition to their recommendation on the Director of 
Posts they did recommend that the Postmaster General should not 
be a political party official. Given the political nature of the appoint-
ment process, it may be questioned whether such limitations could 
ever have been effectively enforced, and the Plan made no such 
attempt. Only two bills73 were ever introduced that included pro-
visions to prohibit appointment of a party official as Postmaster 
General. The Senate Committee on the Post Office and Civil Ser-
vice held hearings on one of these bills, a general reorganization 
proposal, 74 but made no mention of this prohibition. The bill was 
indefinitely postponed because the Committee felt that Reorgani-
zation Plan No. 3 and other bills under consideration-none of 
which addressed the issue of appointment of the Postmaster Gen-
eral-were adequate. A year later, this same recommendation of 
the Hoover Commission was again considered. Testimony before 
the House Committee at that time noted that the incumbent Post-
master General was not a party official, 75 and no further action was 
taken on this recommendation. All Postmasters General since then 
have been selected from outside the Post Office on the basis of po-
litical considerations.76 
Among the most significant of the Hoover Commission recom-
72. 1949 HOOVER COMMISSION, THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT 8 (Recommendations 
I, 2). 
73. S. 2062, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); and a companion House Bill, H.R. 5177, 
81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). 
74. S. 2062, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); Hearings on Bills To Implement Recom-
mendations of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Gov-
ernment Before the Senate Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 81st Cong., 1st 8: 
2d Sess. (1949 8: 1950). 
75. Hearings on Recommendations of the Commission on the Organization of the 
Executive Branch of the Government Before the House Comm. on Post Office and 
Civil Service, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1951). 
76. Arthur E. Summerfield (1953-1961) was the Chairman of the Republican National 
Committee immediately preceding his appointment. J. Edward Day (1961-1963) at the 
time of his appointment was Chairman of the Democratic Association of Los Angeles 
County. John A. Gronouski (1963-1965) was the Commissioner of Taxation for Wis-
consin; while he was Postmaster General he also acted as political liaison to various 
groups. Lawrence F. O'Brien (1965 to date), an original member of the Kennedy "Irish 
Mafia,'' acted as White House liaison with Congress before his appointment, and 
continues to do so. 
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mendations was that Senate confirmation of postmasters be abol-
ished. 77 It is doubtful whether the Reorganization Act of 1949 per-
mitted inclusion of such a provision in a Reorganization Plan,78 
and Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1949 did not so provide. How-
ever, President Truman strongly supported nonpolitical selection 
of postmasters in a special message to Congress: 
It is an axiom of sound administration that authority should be 
commensurate with responsibility. No authority of management is 
more important than that of selecting the personnel who are to 
operate the business. I£ the Postmaster General is to be held re-
sponsible for the efficient conduct of the postal service, he should 
be given full authority to appoint postmasters and other postal em-
ployees subject only to the provisions of the Civil Service and Clas-
sification Acts. Legislation should be enacted which will give such 
authority to the Postmaster General.79 
In this recommendation, stronger than that of the Hoover Com-
mission Report, the President was joined by the Postmaster Gen-
eral, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Civil Service Commission.80 
Beginning with the Eighty-first Congress, there have been intro-
duced to date some ninety bills to remove political influences, to 
a greater or lesser extent, in the naming of postmasters. A favor-
able subcommittee recommendation on one such bill, one of the 
six addressing the issue in the Eighty-first Congress in response to 
the Hoover Commission Report,81 was rejected by the full com-
mittee on grounds that the Senators were better informed as to the 
qualifications of prospective postmasters in their respective states 
than the Postmaster General.82 
The bills fall into two general categories, reflecting varying views 
on the methods of insulating the choice of postmasters from the po-
litical process. The first group would amend section 3311(a) of title 
77. 1949 HOOVER COMMISSION, THE Posr OFFICE DEPARTMENT IO (Recommenda-
tion 5). 
78. See 5 U.S.C. § 904(2) (Supp. II 1965-1966). 
79. H.R. Doc. No. 239, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1949). 
80. Hearings on Bills To Implement Recommendations of the Commission on 
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government Before the Senate Comm. 
on Post Office and Civil Service, 81st Cong., 1st &: 2d Sess., 131 (1949-1950). 
81. S. 2062, S. 2213, H.R. 5177, H.R. 5344, H.R. 5538, H.R. 5643, 81st Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1949). 
82. Hearings on Bills To Implement Recommendations of the Commission on 
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government Before the Senate Comm. 
on Post Office and Civil Service, 81st Cong., 1st &: 2d Sess. 131-34 (1949-1950) (S. 2213). 
The number of bills introduced shows an interesting pattern: in the Eighty-second 
through Eighty-eighth Congresses, between one and four bills were introduced in each 
Congress. In the Eighty-ninth Congress, thirteen bills were introduced; and in the 
Ninetieth, forty-two bills have been introduced to date. 
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39 of the United States Code to provide that the Postmaster General, 
rather than the President, shall appoint postmasters at first-, second-, 
and third-class post offices, and to provide for exclusion of political 
advice and recommendations.83 A second class of bills would con-
tinue the naming of postmasters by the President with Senate con-
firmation but would add a new requirement: that the selection be 
made first from within the Postal Field Service on the basis of non-
competitive examinations; and if no candidate qualifies thereby, by 
competitive examinations. The political influence question would 
be dealt with by a section detailing prohibitions against receiving 
or giving political advice in connection with any position in the 
Postal Field Service, and making violation thereof the cause for 
dismissal and fine.84 Two bills passed by the Senate in the Nine-
tieth Congress now await House action. In different forms both at-
tempt to combine the favorable features of earlier bills. One of 
these is part of the proposed Legislative Reorganization Act of 1967.85 
The history of reform in other spheres is not promising. Despite 
the Hoover Commission's recommendation to simplify some 900 
pages of statutes and regulations applicable to the Post Office, title 
39 of the United States Code today comprises 132 pages, and title 
39 of the Code of Federal Regulations adds another 694 pages. Rec-
ognition by at least some members of Congress of this administrative 
nightmare has yet to produce a comprehensive effort to reform and 
simplify the operational framework of the Department. 
Some changes have been made in the last twenty years. The third 
recommendation of the Hoover Commission-that the Department 
be decentralized into fifteen regions under regional directors-was 
partially implemented in 1955 and fully put into effect by 1956 by 
83. E.g., H.R. 3312, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. 12862, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1967). 
84. E.g., H.R. 5284, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). 
85. S. 355, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) was passed by the Senate on March 7, 1967, 
and referred to the House Rules Committee. Section 441 thereof would amend 39 
U.S.C. § 3311 (1964) to provide for the naming of postmasters by the Postmaster Gen-
eral in accordance with civil service laws and rules by competitive examinations and 
promotions within the postal service. Recommendations or statements by members of 
Congress or party officials would be prohibited. Sections 442 and 443 of the bill extend 
essentially the same provisions to the naming of interim postmasters and the appoint-
ment of rural carriers. 
The second bill, S. 2154, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), was passed by the Senate on 
November 30, 1967. It would amend 39 U.S.C. § 3311 (1964) to read: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Postmaster General shall appoint 
postmasters in accordance with the Civil Service Act and rules except that in each 
case he shall appoint the person who is certified to him by the Civil Service Com-
mission as the eligible applicant who has the highest earned rating among the 
applicants examined. 
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regulation.86 Ironically, this was the one Hoover Report recom-
mendation most strongly opposed by both the President and the 
Postmaster General, on grounds that the Postmaster General could 
not genuinely decentralize what authority he had; that he could not, 
for example, allow regions to set local wage scales, as a decentralized 
industry might.87 The subsequent history of the postal regions sug-
gests that the President and Postmaster General may have been cor-
rect: regions now have inadequate authority or information to 
pass on many issues put to them, and they often function either as 
rubber stamps for the postmasters or as intermediaries between the 
postmasters and the office of the Postmaster General. 88 
The picture is not entirely bleak. A key recommendation of the 
Hoover Report, that the business-type controls of the Government 
Corporation Control Act of 194589 be made applicable to the Post 
Office, was at least partially effected, with favorable results. The 
recommendation was not literally followed, but an important first 
step in simplifying fiscal operations was embodied in the Post Office 
Appropriation Act of 1951:90 reduction of the number of individual 
appropriations from fifty-eight to four.91 The second step was pas-
sage of the Post Office Department Financial Control Act of 1950.92 
This Act centralized accounting and reporting functions previously 
performed by the General Accounting Office in the Post Office De-
partment; provided a revolving fund for the Post Office composed 
of its revenues plus additional appropriations necessary to cover pre-
dicted deficits; provided for separate reporting of services performed 
free or at special rates; authorized audit of the Department by the 
Comptroller General; and implemented other administrative sim-
plifications. The Act was designed generally to afford flexibility in 
accounting and auditing procedures and to allow better use of ac-
86. See S. REP. No. 167, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1957); 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &: ADMN. 
NEWS, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3274 (1955). The postal regions are established by 39 C.F.R. 
§ 811.3 (1967). 
87. Hearings on Bills To Implement Recommendations of the Commission on 
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government Before the Senate Comm. 
on Post Office and Civil Service, 81st Cong., 1st &: 2d Sess. 19-21. But see W. DOHERTY, 
MAILMAN, U.S.A. 203 (1960), in which a former president of the National Association 
of Letter Carriers suggests that the Postmaster General's objection to this recom-
mendation was provoked by his personal inability to delegate responsibility. 
88. See 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 733-34; DOHERTY, supra note 87, at 
262. 
89. 31 u.s.c. §§ 841-69 (1964). 
90. Post Office Department Appropriation Act of 1951, 64 Stat. 640 (1950). 
91. There are now seven appropriation headings. See note 34 supra. 
92. 39 u.s.c. §§ 2202, 2206-08, 2211 (1964). 
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counting techniques as tools of management;93 without question 
administration was significantly simplified. But today, more than 
fifteen years since passage of these simplifications, the Department 
has taken only the first steps toward using business-type financial 
controls.94 The annual appropriation process and the associated ac-
counting for legality of obligations, as opposed to efficiency of oper-
ations, has much to do with this lack of progress. 
Other major problems of the Post Office remain untouched. 
Ratemaking is still a highly charged political process largely un-
related to Post Office needs or operations. The same must be said of 
wages, and of the classes and details of service. Capital financing and 
research and development have seen improvements, as have training 
programs, but as to these far more remains to be done than has been 
done to date. And in periods of fiscal austerity, financial investments 
in progress may be small. 
The verdict is inescapable. Congress has not done the job, partly 
because it has had to satisfy conflicting political desires, but perhaps 
primarily because it cannot handle the details of a complex depart-
ment's operations, and it has consistently failed to give the necessary 
authority and incentive to those who can and should improve the 
Department: those within the Department itself. Recent history 
suggests that some measure of congressional disengagement may 
afford the only hope for true reform. Can some other form of organi-
zation-for example, the public corporation-reasonably be ex-
pected to do the job better? If so, what must be done to establish 
the necessary organizational framework? 
III. THE OPERATIONS OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS 
Of the wide variety of organizations that can be used to carry on 
the government's public enterprises, the most tightly tied to the 
government is the department or ministry, the category into which 
the United States Post Office Department presently fits. Public 
authorities, often of a local or regional nature, are widely used for 
the operation of roads, bridges, tunnels, and ports, as well as con-
servation and utility projects.95 Alternatively, services of an in-
herently monopolistic nature or those affected with a public interest 
may be provided by private corporations subject to control by a 
regulatory commission, of which examples on a national level are the 
93. See H.R. REP. No. 2339, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1950). 
94. See text accompanying note 39 supra. 
95. See .ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE PROBLEM OF 
SPECIAL DISTRicrs IN AMEru:CAN GOVERNMENT 12-25 (1964). 
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Federal Power Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, and 
Federal Communications Commission. In addition to these familiar 
forms of public enterprise, there are as well the private stock cor-
poration used for public enterprises,96 the mixed enterprise, and the 
public corporation. 
Discussion herein will be directed to possible use of the public 
corporation for the Post Office, although it is clear that arguments 
might be advanced in favor of using another form of organization. 
Telephone service, though provided by a government department or 
ministry in virtually all other nations of the world,97 is in the United 
States provided by a private corporation regulated by federal and 
state regulatory commissions. While this approach can be adapted to 
the Post Office,98 the Post Office has existed so long under tight gov-
ernment control that any attempt to move it into the hands of private 
stockholders, however regulated, might encounter insurmountable 
political resistance. Moreover, the problems of organization and 
transition to public corporation status would be considerably less 
complex than those attendant upon establishment and capitalization 
of a private corporation together with the necessary regulatory com-
mission.99 Although the private corporation idea is not considered in 
detail herein, many of the critical attributes of any workable public 
corporation arrangement must be similar if not identical to those 
of a regulated private corporation. A mixed enterprise might intro-
duce capital contributions by private investors as well as the govern-
ment, with some sharing of control between the government and the 
private shareholders. While reduction of the government's invest-
ment in the Post Office may be desirable, there do not appear to be 
compelling reasons for shifting control to the private investors, and 
as the TVA example shows,100 bond financing in a wholly public 
corporation can reduce the government's investment without affect-
ing control. Finally, the distinction between the public corporation 
96. See w. ROBSON, NATIONALIZED INDUSTRY AND PUBUC OWNERSHIP 27-28 (1960) 
(citing use of this device in India at the present time, and in England briefly during 
nationalization of the steel industry). 
97. ROBSON, supra note 96, at 24. 
98. See, e.g., Milton Friedman's oversimplified suggestion to allow competition in 
the delivery of mails by revocation of 39 U.S.C. § 901 (1964). NEWSWEEK, Oct. 9, 1967, 
at 87. 
99. Creation of a public corporation subject to internal governmental control often 
obviates the need for a regulatory commission. See Lilienthal &: Marquis, The Con-
duct of Business Enterprises by the Federal Government, 54 HARV. L. REv. 545, 575 
(1941). But cf. the mixed internal and regulatory control structure of the Communica-
tions Satellite Corporation discussed in Schwartz, Comsat, the Carriers, and the Earth 
Stations: Some Problems With "Melding Variegated Interests," 76 YALE L.J. 441 (1967). 
100. See text accompanying note 151 infra. 
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and the public authority may be largely a matter of definition, the 
latter often being considered a form of public corporation. Both 
have been used to carry out local or regional activities with a degree 
of insulation from the usual political process and an element of 
financial independence; and, in both, politics still plays a role.101 
Reorganization of the Post Office would look toward an organization 
of this type, but of nationwide scope. At the root of our inquiry will 
be the powers and control structure of such an enterprise, whatever 
it be called. 
Among the best developed examples of public corporations are 
the nationalized industries of Great Britain and several public corpo-
rations in the United States. In the first group are the National Coal 
Board, the British Electric Authority, the Gas Council, the British 
Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) and the British European 
Airways (BEA). The British Post Office, though not in law a national-
ized industry, is conducted as such.102 In the second group are the 
World War I emergency corporations,1°3 various banking corpora-
tions, 104 and the TV A. More numerous are corporations or public 
authorities organized by state governments or by interstate agree-
ments, such as the Port of New York Authority.105 The nationalized 
industries, which are essentially commercial enterprises involved in 
selling a product or service to consumers, and TV A, part of whose 
operations are of this type, bear marked similarities to the operations 
of the Post Office; details of their relations with the government offer 
clues to the utility of the corporate form as it might be applied to 
the delivery of mail. For aside from its long history as a government 
department affected with a public interest, the Post Office is essen-
tially a business enterprise rendering a commercial service to the 
public for a fee. And, at least arguably, the public interest in it is 
not substantially different from that in the telephone system, which 
is a regulated private corporation. British experience with their 
IOI. See R. WooD, 1400 GOVERNMENTS 131-34 (1964). Illustrative of the detailed 
arguments on definitions is Gerwig, Public Authorities in the United States, 26 LAW 
& CoNTEMP, PROB, 591, 592-94 (1961). 
102. See SELEcr COMMITI'EE REPORT 7. 
103. For example, the Emergency Fleet Corporation. See Abel, The Public Cor-
poration in the United States, m THE PUBUC CORPORATION 338, 341 (W. Friedmann 
ed. 1954). 
104. For example, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. See Abel, supra note 
103, at 343; Lilienthal & Marquis, supra note 99, at 548-49. 
105. More than 18,000 such corporations or "special districts" were m existence 
m 1964. Numbers will vary based on definitions. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE PROBLEM OF SPECIAL DISTRICTS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 
26-33 (1964). 
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nationalized industries led, in fact, to the proposal that their Post 
Office be reorganized as a public corporation.106 
It is important to note that the nationalized industries are ex-
amples of private corporations or local public authorities reorganized 
as national public enterprises, a movement toward greater govern-
ment control. By contrast, any suggestion that the Post Office-a 
government department-be reorganized as a public corporation asks 
for a movement toward greater autonomy. TV A involved organiza-
tion of governmental activities as a public corporation, but TV A was 
initiated as a government corporation, and its activities, too, are 
in large part commercial in the recognized sense. Thus, reorganiza-
tion of the Post Office as a public corporation would represent an 
unprecedented divestiture of control by the Congress and the Execu-
tive in one of the government's largest enterprises. 
Use of public corporations in both Great Britain and the United 
States was sparked by the need for greater managerial independence 
and control over details of operations than would be afforded by a 
government department: 
The underlying reason for the creation of the modem type of public 
corporation is the need for a high degree of freedom, boldness and 
enterprise in the management of undertakings of an industrial or 
commercial character and the desire to escape from the caution and 
circumspection which is considered typical of government depart-
ments.101 
Earl Attlee, a former Postmaster-General, stated the effect of detailed 
government control as follows: 
[It] tends to timidity and centralization and has militated against 
the adoption of a public relations technique in the service .... The 
Minister and his principal officials, who ought to be concerned with 
major problems, are constantly diverted to deal with matters which 
owe their importance only to the status of those who bring them 
forward.108 
Full realization of the potential benefits of public corporations 
turns on the presence of several essential characteristics. The first 
106. See REORGANISATION OF THE Posr OFFICE, CMND. No. 3233 (1967). 
107. ROBSON, supra note 96, at 47. The footnote to this sentence notes: 
The Post Office has been criticized by members of all political parties as an 
example of how the constitution of an ordinary government department is ill-
designed to secure business efficiency in the services which it administers. Criti-
cism culminated in a Memorial signed by some 320 M.Ps. and addressed to the 
Prime Minister in December, 1931. See the Report of the Committee of Inquiry 
on the Post Office, HMSO, CMND. 4149/1932. 
108. Attlee, Post Office Reform, NEW STATESMAN &: NATION, Nov. 7, 1931 (cited in 
ROBSON, supra note 96, at 59). 
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is freedom from governmental inquiry into the details of manage-
ment, as opposed to over-all policy. The second is disinterestedness, 
in the sense that the corporation's board of directors not be en-
joined to make a profit for the benefit of shareholders, but rather to 
run the corporation in the public interest, on an essentially self-
sustaining basis. In addition, those corporations should not be a 
part of the civil service; and while they might be subject to occa-
sional admonitions to keep wage scales in line with those paid 
government employees, they should not be subject to detailed regu-
lations on conditions of service, hiring, dismissal, and the like. 
Neither should finances of public corporations be subject to all the 
controls of the appropriation process, despite government control 
over some aspects of financial operations. Finally, the boards of these 
corporations should have fixed terms-they should not change with 
each administration, nor have the life tenure of career civil ser-
vants.109 
The public corporation is based on the theory that a full measure 
of accountability can be imposed on a public authority without 
requiring it to be subject to ministerial control in respect of its 
managerial decisions and multitudinous routine activities, or liable 
to comprehensive parliamentary scrutiny of its day-to-day working. 
The theory assumes that policy, in major matters at least, can be 
distinguished from management or administration; and that a suc-
cessful combination of political control and managerial freedom can 
be achieved by reserving certain powers of decision in matters of 
major importance to Ministers answerable to Parliament and leaving 
everything else to the discretion of the public corporation acting 
within its legal competence. The Government are further endowed 
with residual powers of direction and appointment which mark their 
unquestionable authority.110 
Have these broad principles been effected in the British national-
ized industries and their American counterparts? Did the corpora-
tions achieve the purposes for which they were created? 
A. The British Nationalized Industries 
In view of the similarity of organization and control among the 
British nationalized industries, they may usefully be discussed col-
lectively. Major areas of control are relationships between the 
minister and the corporation board, and between Parliament and 
both the minister and the board. 
109. See Lilienthal &: Marquis, supra note 99, at 560-67; ROBSON, supra note 96, 
at 64-69. 
110. Id. at 74, 76. 
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The appropriate minister names the members of the corpora-
tion's board. He may give the corporation "directions of a general 
character as to the exercise and performance by the corporation of 
their functions in relation to matters appearing to the Minister to 
affect the national interest";111 and the corporation is bound to give 
effect to these directions. To this broad grant are appended certain 
stated powers; thus, the minister has express statutory power, 
with Treasury approval, to give detailed directions concerning 
the establishment, management and application of a reserve fund, 
provided only that any application of the fund must be for purposes 
of the corporation. Reorganization or development programs in-
volving substantial commitments of capital must be framed along 
lines approved by the minister. In addition, stated powers may be 
granted on major matters affecting certain corporations; for example, 
the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation has power to require 
all aircraft used by BOAC and BEA to be registered in some part 
of Great Britain. Other powers are conferred on the Treasury: it 
must approve salaries of chairmen, deputy chairmen, and members of 
the boards. It also has general approval over establishment and use 
of reserve funds, and over the form of financial statements in the 
annual accounting. And, most important, borrowing by the cor-
porations is from the ministry by consent of both the minister and 
the Treasury.112 
This statutory framework-particularly the naming of the board 
and approval of reorganizations-clearly affords the government 
very substantial control over the operations of the corporations.113 
But it does not, at least on its face, substantially limit the corpora-
tions in such detailed business questions as choice of equipment, type 
of service, and rates to be charged therefor. And the financial objec-
tive, as outlined in a 1961 White Paper, does not seriously limit the 
freedom of the corporations: they are required to break even (in-
cluding a return on investment and charges for depreciation and con-
tingencies) over a five-year period.114 But in practice, control over the 
corporations has been substantially expanded. The statutory formula 
III. Id. at 139. See, e.g., Gas Act, 1948, II & 12 Geo. 6, c. 67, § 7(1); Electricity 
Act, 1957, 5 &: 6 Eliz. 2, c. 48, § 8(1). 
II2. E.g., Electricity Act, 1963, c. 59, § 2(1). On long-term capital planning, there 
is now annual discussion between the corporation and the government. THE FINANCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC OBUGATIONS OF THE NATIONALIZED INDUSTRIES, CMND. No. 1337, at 8-9 
(1961). 
II3. See Albu, Ministerial and Parlimentary Control, in THE LEssoNs OF PUBuc 
ENTERPRISE 93-94 (M. Shanks ed. 1963). 
II4. THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC OBUGATIONS OF THE NATIONALIZED INDUSTRIES, 
CMND. No. 1337, at 7, 8 (1961). The industries have varied in their ability to break 
even. Id. at 11. 
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concerning ministerial intervention is open to varying interpreta-
tion, and any attempt at narrow interpretation by the board of a 
corporation might well be met with overwhelming counterpressure 
-perhaps in the form of proposed legislation-by the appropriate 
minister. The ministerial power to appoint and reappoint board 
members is also not an inconsiderable weapon. Ministers have 
tended by the use of such influence to exercise substantially more 
control over the corporations than the statutory language, or their 
infrequent public announcements, would indicate.ms Indeed, at 
least a few ministers have suggested that they have a duty to exercise 
such influence, and in some industries pricing and wages have been 
subject to continual ministerial intervention, with clearly undesir-
able results.116 This practice raises questions on the extent of govern-
ment control over operations and the form in which any such control 
should be exercised. 
We have noted that the advantages to be obtained from the 
public corporation, as opposed to a government department, derive 
from its autonomy in certain key areas such as prices, employment, 
and details of service. There can be little question that if all of 
these areas are subject to detailed governmental control the corpora-
tion will remain only a concept while the organization continues to 
be run entirely as a government department.117 On the other hand, 
an enterprise vested with a key national interest may in the course of 
making business-type decisions impair major national objectives. 
While many of these decisions affecting the national interest can 
be dealt with by statute (as, for example, the British statutory re-
quirement of approval of major capital expenditure by the Treasury), 
an equal number of such problems-often arising unforeseen-must 
be dealt with on an ad hoc basis.118 As to these, the necessity of a 
concordance of business interest and public interest is inescapable: 
When full allowance has been made for the possibility that Ministers 
may not always act from politically disinterested motives, there is 
115. Albu, supra note 113, at 91, 93-99. This influence has been used most fre-
quently in the area of price. Jenkins, Foreword, in THE LEssoNs OF Punuc ENTERPRISE 
8-9 (M. Shanks ed. 1963). 
116. ROBSON, supra note 98, at 142-44, 150-56 (transport and coal): Shanks, Prices 
and Profits, in THE LEssoNs OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 56-58, 62 (M. Shanks ed. 196!1); 
Shanks, The Aims and the Problems, in THE LEssoNs OF Punuc ENTERPRISE 17, 30-31 
(M. Shanks ed. 1963). 
117. Even in that situation it is critical who in the government actually controls 
the enterprise. A major problem discussed earlier is that Congress-and not the Post• 
master General-runs much of the Post Office. Text accompanying note 28 supra. 
118. See Note, The Role of the Public Corporation in British Nationalized Indus-
try, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 534, 537 (1949). 
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nevertheless a hard core of truth in the assertion that most elusive, 
nebulous, and frequently abused concept "the national interest" 
may sometimes point in a different direction from that indicated 
by the needs of a public corporation considered in isolation. Hence 
in the last resort the Minister must be able to override the board.119 
The problem, then, is to preserve a governmental voice on issues 
of national concern while maintaining autonomy. It may be possible 
to preserve essential autonomy by limiting the ministerial power to 
overrule to those situations where the public interest genuinely 
demands it. If discretion over rates, operations, and the like is vested 
primarily in the corporation's board (with whatever specific excep-
tions might be essential, such as continuation of unprofitable ser-
vices), with the governmental authority to overrule exercisable only 
when the national interest so demands, and then only by formal 
direction of the minister, there is at least a political check on such 
exercise: 
It may be argued that in present-day Britain with its regulated 
economy and narrow margins it is inevitable that the government of 
the day will want to control by one method or another the price 
and wage policies of nationalized industries .... But I do not accept 
this contention nor the premises on which it is based. The deter-
mination of wages and prices in nationalized industries should not 
normally be a political matter at all. The government should inter-
vene only when they are prepared to accept full and formal responsi-
bility to the public and to Parliament for the decision. If this 
principle were to be accepted there would be a notable reduction in 
the "political" element in most decisions about wages and prices 
except on comparatively rare occasions.120 
Direct parliamentary control over the nationalized industries 
is exercised primarily in the initial drafting of the corporate charters 
and associated statutes. This area of control is expanded by the 
practice of questioning the minister in Parliament, to the extent 
questions are admissible and are in fact answered by the minister. 
Parliamentary procedure offers two points at which questions may be 
rejected: they may be refused by the Speaker through the clerks of 
the House, or the minister may himself refuse to answer them. The 
extent of admissibility of questions on nationalized industries has 
been the subject of contention, some taking the view that the ulti-
mate responsibility of ministers justifies a rule that virtually all 
119. ROBSON, supra note 96, at 158. 
120. Id. at 160. But see Albu, supra note 11!1, at 110-12 (suggesting a semi-inde-
pendent board, with policy clearly in ministerial hands). 
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questions should be allowed and others arguing that unrestricted 
questioning would in effect destroy the necessary independence of 
these corporations.121 It is difficult to demonstrate that expanding 
the scope of inquiry by Parliament would affect adversely the per-
formance of the nationalized industries, but the history of the 
United States Post Office strongly suggests that detailed legislative 
control can have substantial inhibiting effects. But expanded ques-
tioning appears likely: the clerks of Commons now reject only 
repetitive questions and those concerning details of administration; 
all others must be answered or refused by the minister on the floor 
of the House. Members of Parliament have developed ways of cir-
cumventing these rules and, occasionally, of forcing answers to 
questions. In short, although Parliament spends less time and in-
quires in less detail into the nationalized industries than do Congress 
and its committees into governmental departments, the degree of 
control exercised, particularly when added to the influence of the 
ministers, is substantial and often detailed.122 
As the public enterprise is granted greater autonomy the question 
of how to assure financial accountability becomes critical. The 
Public Accounts Committee of Parliament has authority to examine 
financial reports submitted to Parliament, but the authority to ex-
amine and certify or to audit is granted to the Auditor General only 
as to those corporations wholly or mainly dependent on money voted 
by Parliament. Most of the nationalized industries are thereby ex-
cluded. It has been suggested that this should be remedied by crea-
tion of an audit commission to report to the Standing Committee 
on Nationalized Industries; this commission would perform a full 
efficiency audit, apparently much like the studies of the Comptroller 
General of the United States. It has been contended that financial 
accountability through such efficiency audits in addition to account-
ability through ministers and directly to Parliament would tend to: 
(1) satisfy the government and the public that the nationalized 
industries are being run efficiently and progressively; (2) prevent 
exploitation of consumers through use of monopolistic position; and 
(3) prevent work stoppages due to bad labor relations.123 Account-
ability, however, is inextricably intertwined with control, and ex-
perience ·with the United States General Accounting Office124 suggests 
that the very existence of such an audit organ, unless it were circum-
121. See ROBSON, supra note 96, at 163-66, 169-75. 
122. Id. at 175-76, 181-83. 
123. Id. at 195, 203-06, 210-11. 
124. See Lilienthal &: Marquis, supra note 99, at 577-86. 
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scribed in the scope of its activities, might unduly extend detailed 
control by the government. 
B. The Tennessee Valley Authority 
Public corporations in the United States date back to the Bank of 
North America, created by the Continental Congress in 1781. The 
First and Second Banks of the United States were also public cor-
porations.120 Use of the public corporation as an arm of the govern-
ment began in earnest during World War I, with the creation of 
such corporations as the Emergency Fleet Corporation and the War 
Finance Corporation.126 Perhaps the most successful American public 
corporation, and surely the most carefully analyzed, is the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, chartered by statute in 1933.127 Moreover, TVA 
remains unique among federally chartered public corporations in 
its independence and business oriented control structure. Curiously, 
despite the success of the TVA, the government corporation has not 
until recently found wider use.128 
The Tennessee Valley Authority is a corporation; and though 
corporate status per se does not carry special rights or privileges, it 
is clear that use of the corporate form was intended to confer con-
siderable freedom, approaching that of a private commercial com-
pany.120 At its head is a full-time, three-man board of directors, with 
staggered nine-year terms, named by the President and confirmed by 
the Senate. The President designates the chairman thereof, but all 
other officials, agents, and employees are selected by the board or its 
delegates.130 In the early days of TV A, the board members attempted 
to act both as policymakers and as administrators. The experience, 
under Chairman Arthur Morgan, progressed from the merely con-
fusing to the absolutely disastrous. Initially, the three directors split 
up the operations of TVA into three areas of total responsibility. Al-
125. For a listing of early public corporations in the United States, see Note, supra 
note 118. 
U. PA. L. REv. 534 (1949). 
126. Lilienthal & Marquis, supra note 99, at 547-48. 
127. 16 U.S.C. §§ 831-83ldd (1964). 
128. Other "valley authorities," modeled after the TV A, were proposed as public 
corporations in bills introduced in the mid-1940's. None of the proposals was passed. 
See Clark, Proposed "Valley Authority" Legislation, 40 AM. PoL. Ser. R.Ev. 62 (1946). 
In each of these proposals, key features of TVA-civil service exemption, bond financ-
ing, and corporate status-were included. Id. at 62-63, 67-68, 70. The Corporation for 
Public Broadcasting, authorized by Public Law 90-129 (May 26, 1967) is similar to 
TVA in the degree of its autonomy, but without authority to raise funds by sale of 
bonds. Id. § 396. 
129. See H.R. REP. No. 130, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1933); Swidler, Legal Founda-
tions, in T.V.A.-THE Fmsr TWENTY YEARS 16, 26-29 (R. Martin ed. 1956). 
ll!O. 16 U.S.C. §§ 831a & b (1964). 
642 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 66:615 
though one commentator suggests the possibility that the early 
spectacular achievement of TV A may be attributable to this orga-
nization, 131 the division of responsibility, together with the varying 
philosophies of the board members and Chairman Morgan's domi-
neering personality, led ultimately to President Roosevelt's removal 
of Morgan and an unusually bitter congressional investigation of 
TVA.132 The upshot of the Morgan affair was confirmation of the 
President's authority to remove a board member.133 But the contro-
versy left TVA's autonomy in all other respects unaffected, and 1937 
saw the establishment, over Morgan's objections, of a General 
Manager as the chief administrative officer of TV A.134 
The uniqueness of TVA lies in the board's responsibility and 
independence, delegated in turn through the General Manager 
into the organization. The corporation is specifically exempted from 
the civil service laws, and this exemption is coupled with a power-
ful injunction against the use of political influence: 
In the appointment of officials and the selection of employees for 
said Corporation, and in the promotion of any such employees or 
officials, no political test or qualifications shall be permitted or 
given consideration, but all such appointments and promotions shall 
be given and made on the basis of merit and efficiency. Any member 
of said board who is found by the President of the United States to 
be guilty of a violation of this section shall be removed from office 
by the President of the United States, and any appointee of said 
board who is found by the board to be guilty of a violation of this 
section shall be removed from office by said board.135 
This statute attempted to preserve the best of the civil service system 
-merit promotions and elimination of the spoils system-while 
avoiding the inhibiting influences of standardized examinations, 
uniform pay scales, and cumbersome dismissal procedures. Initiation 
of such a system was an act of confidence; the virtually absolute ex-
clusion of politics from TVA and the unusually high morale and 
devotion of TVA employees have borne out this trust.136 Added flex-
ibility is found in at least three areas: wages and salaries (TVA has 
nonetheless tended to follow the civil service lead on salaries and 
131. See C. PRITCHE1T, THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 156-57 (1943). 
132. For the details of this important early development in TVA, see id. at 186-216. 
133. Morgan v. TVA, 115 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 701 (1941). 
134. See PRITCHE1T, supra note 131, at 163-70; Oliver, Administrative Foundations, 
in -T.V.A.-THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS 35, 39-42 (R. Martin ed. 1956). 
135. 16 U.S.C. § 831a (1964). Compare the proposed provisions to preclude political 
influence in the naming of postmasters discussed in note 85 supra. 
136. See PRITCHE1T, supra note 131, at 267-71, 282-83; Case, Personnel Administra-
tion, in T.V.A.-THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS 50, 52-55 (R. Martin ed. 1956). 
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is required to pay prevailing area wages), 137 hiring standards and 
procedures,138 and firing.130 The TV A has developed a decentralized 
personnel administration by which supervisors select those they wish 
to hire from a list and are then held responsible for the work of their 
employees; dismissal and appeals procedures are similarly localized, 
starting with the employee's immediate supervisor.140 Moreover, 
labor relations-by any standard-have been particularly good.141 
Clearly, TV A cannot be allowed complete autonomy in its opera-
tions, and the means of congressional and executive control are 
several. As with the British nationalized industries, the most power-
ful means of control is legislation; in both situations this has been 
used sparingly and with little inhibiting effect on autonomy.142 The 
Statute itself grants very broad discretion to the TVA board. But 
since the TV A program is not fully self-supporting, a potential area 
of control is appropriations.143 In some respects, the financial limita-
tions of TVA parallel those of governmental departments: it sub-
mits a budget, some seventeen months in advance of the beginning 
of the fiscal year, to the Bureau of the Budget, and that budget is 
included in the President's budget passed on by Congress.144 But 
there are critical differences in the financial structure of TV A as 
compared with governmental departments. By contrast with other 
government agencies, TVA receives most of its appropriation in a 
lump sum available for all programs and not limited to one fiscal 
year.145 Moreover, bond financing is a potential source of financial 
independence, even though the original statute was so drawn as to 
137. 16 U.S.C. § 831b (1964). TVA is still subject, however, to veterans' preferences, 
anti-communist provisions, and some other restrictions. See Case, supra note 136, at 
52-53. 
138. 16 U.S.C. § 831b (1964). 
139. See PRITCHEIT, supra note 131, at 295. 
140. See Case, supra note 136, at 55-56. 
141. Thompson, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service-The T.V.A. Experi-
ence and Its Implications for Other Government Agencies, 17 LAB. L.J. 89, 90-91 
(1966). 
142. See PRITCHE'IT, supra note 131, at 229-30. Indeed, subsequent legislation has 
increased TV A's independence in some areas. See text accompanying note 150 infra. 
143. Even a self-supporting organization, like several of the nationalized industries, 
is subject to audit and other investigatory controls. Indeed, even a private corporation 
vested with a public interest will be subject to legislative or administrative control, 
often by a regulatory commission. The appropriations "lever" is clearly not essential 
to the exercise of such control, but it often makes possible control of the excruciat-
ingly detailed type that is now applied to the Post Office. 
144. See Clark, Financial Administration, in T.V.A.-THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS 62, 
64-68 (R. Martin ed. 1956). 
145. Jones, The Financing of TVA, 26 LAw &: CONTEMP. PROB. 725, 730-31 (1961). 
Compare the subdivided, time-limited appropriations of the Post Office discussed in 
the text accompanying note 34 supra. 
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render the use of bond financing quite unlikely.146 However, in con-
nection with the TV A's acquisition of the power facilities of the 
Commonwealth and Southern Corporation, Congress authorized the 
issuance of $61.5 million worth of bonds; these were issued to the 
United States Treasury in 1939-1941.147 
Still, an early commentator was disturbed at the inadequate use 
of bond financing and the failure to make provision for repayment 
of congressional appropriations and payment of some return thereon 
to the Treasury.148 Although even the original act required TVA to 
repay to the Treasury its net proceeds in excess of expenses (less a 
reserve of $1 million), at least in the early years there was no 
such excess to repay.149 The situation has changed greatly, both in 
operations and in financing. Power and fertilizer operations began to 
produce substantial revenues, so that by the end of fiscal year 1960, 
TVA had paid pursuant to this section $185 million of power pro-
ceeds and $41.5 million of nonpower proceeds to the Treasury, in 
addition to the repayment of the bonds issued in 1939-1941.150 
Moreover, in 1959 TVA was given more general authority to bor-
row up to $750 million for power financing, since increased to $1.75 
billion.151 As of June 30, 1966, debt outstanding under this section 
was $385 million.152 Of equal importance, the new section provides 
for repayment beginning in fiscal year 1961, of the congressional ap-
propriations investment in TVA at the rate of $10 million annually 
for five years, $15 million for the next five, and $20 million there-
after, until $1 billion has been repaid. In addition, TVA now must 
pay a return on the net appropriations investment equal to the 
average interest rate payable by the Treasury on its public obli-
gations as of the beginning of the fiscal year.153 In 1967, payments 
were $62.125 million under this section: $15 million as repayment, 
and $47.125 million as a return (4.134 per cent on an investment 
of $1.14 million) on appropriations. The results of such repayments 
have been dramatic: in 1956, the portion of the power investment 
146. 16 U.S.C. §§ 831n, 83ln-1 (1964); see PRITCHETI, supra note 131, at 236-37. 
147. 16 U.S.C. § 83ln-3 (1964); see PRITCHETT, supra note 131, at 238. 
148. Id. at 238-41. 
149. 16 U.S.C. § 83ly (1964); see PRITCHETI, supra note 131, at 235-36. 
150. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT A-11 (1960), A-9 (1961). 
151. 73 Stat. 280 (1959), as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 83ln-4(a) (Supp. II 1965-1966). 
Note that these bonds are not obligations of the United States Government nor are 
they guaranteed by the Treasury; and while the Treasury has authority to defer 
issuance of such bonds, its authority is limited. See note 195 infra. 
152. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT A-14 (1966). 
153. 16 U.S.C. § 83ln-4(e) (1964). See Jones, supra note 145, at 737-39. Similar re-
quirements are imposed on the British nationalized industries. THE FINANCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC OBUGATIONS OF THE NATIONALIZED INDUSTRIES, CMND. No. 1337, at 4-5 (1961). 
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represented by appropriations was seventy-seven per cent; by the 
end of fiscal 1966, it was less than fifty-two per cent. Appropriations 
now no longer are applied in any significant measure to power pro-
grams, but rather go toward the other aspects of TVA operations;154 
indeed, in 1966 total TVA appropriations of $59 million were very 
nearly matched by returns of the power program of over $58 mil-
lion.155 In short, profitability of the power program and increased 
use of bond financing-with concomitant elimination of reliance on 
appropriations except as to nonpower programs-have reduced the 
congressional lever of appropriations as a means of control, at least 
as to the power programs,156 and possibly as to other programs as 
well. 
But control in the fiscal area does not stop at appropriations: the 
statute also requires TVA to file an annual report and confers audit 
authority on the Comptroller General.157 The importance of audit by 
the General Accounting Office (headed by the Comptroller General) 
lies in its authority to "settle and adjust accounts" under the Budget 
and Accounting Act of 1921, as amended.158 Acting as an arm of 
Congress, the Comptroller General may retroactively disallow ex-
penditures; he exercises this authority broadly, inquiring into the 
details of legality and appropriateness of all expenditures and 
disallowing in toto items on which he has any question.159 Shortly 
after establishment of TVA, issue was joined between TVA and the 
General Accounting Office on the extent of the latter's audit au-
thority under the TVA Act, with the result that in 1941 the TVA 
Act was amended to prevent the Comptroller General from disallow-
ing expenses determined by the TV A board to be necessary to carry 
out the provisions of the Act.160 Since then, TV A's accounting system 
154. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT 52-53 (1966). 
155. Id. at A-11. 
156. Of special interest, perhaps, in contemplating a TVA-type setup for the Post 
Office Department is our power financing. TVA exercise its highest degree of 
autonomy in the management of its power system since it is financed for all prac-
tical purposes from power revenues and borrowings, and congressional appropria-
tions are not required. However, as I have indicated, TVA keeps Congress and the 
President's office fully informed of its activities in the power field through its annual 
report and its annual budget submissions. 
Letter from Aubrey J. Wagner, Chairman of the Board of Directors, TVA, to Thomas 
L. Smithson, Jan. 8, 1968, on file in the author's office. 
157. 16 U.S.C. § 831h (1964). 
158. 31 u.s.c. §§ 71, 74 (1964). 
159. See Lilienthal &: Marquis, The Conduct of Business Enterprises by the Federal 
Government, 54 HARv. L. REv. 545, 577-79 (1941). 
160. 16 U.S.C. § 83lh(b) (1964). See PRITCHETr, supra note 131, at 249-63, for the 
history of the GAO-TVA dispute. Another important area of independence written 
into the same section of the Act is freedom from the usual government purchasing 
requirements. 
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and procedures have been highly praised by the General Accounting 
Office and others;161 more important, however, the flexibility afforded 
by freedom from accounting to the General Accounting Office 
for specific expenditures in accordance with appropriations162 has 
allowed for the development of a genuinely useful accounting system. 
Resulting financial statements are similar to commercial statements, 
and in addition they break down operations into meaningful activ-
ities for which costs are separately accumulated: for example, power, 
fertilizer, agricultural and munitions developments, and flood con-
trol operations.163 
C. Evaluating TVA and the Nationalized Industries 
In evaluating TVA and the British nationalized industries, it is 
essential at the outset to realize that there is no general agreement 
on either the criteria of evaluation or the benchmarks against which 
any comparative evaluation should be made. Profitability, the 
market-place standard of evaluating private industries, suffers from 
obvious defects. It is not the primary aim of the public corporation. 
Moreover, income or deficit may turn on the extent of public-service 
subsidy, the degree to which monopoly position is exploited or ig-
nored in pricing, the quality and extent of service provided, and 
other factors not reflective of the total performance of the enterprise. 
A more nebulous, less quantifiable standard must be applied: the 
effectiveness and economy with which the ends sought from the cor-
poration are pursued, and the degree to which they are achieved.164 
Application of such a standard is confused by the multiplicity of 
numerical criteria it comprehends (output in kilowatt-hours, price 
and costs, employment, and capital investment, among others), by 
the nonquantifiable standards that must be included (for example, 
worker satisfaction, fulfillment of purposes, and public attitudes), and 
by the lack of uniformity in standards of comparison. Some activities 
of TVA, such as power production, may be compared with private 
161. See Clark, supra note 144, at 68. From 1938 to 1944, TVA was audited by a 
firm of independent certified public accountants, but in 1945 TV A, along with other 
government agencies, was prohibited from making expenditures for outside auditors. 
31 U.S.C. § 866(d) (1964). The 1959 bond authorization amendments to the TV A Act 
permitted resumption of audits by certified public accountants in fiscal year 1960. 
16 u.s.c. § 83ln-4(c) (1964). See TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REl>ORT A-2 
(1960). 
162. See the criticism of GAO examinations in Beach, Role of the General Account-
ing Office in the Regulation of Industry, 21 Bus. LAW 235 (1965); Lilienthal 8: Marquis, 
supra note 159, at 581-84. 
163. See TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REl>ORT A-1 through A-14 (1966). 
164. See w. ROBSON, NATIONAUZED INDUSTRY AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 416-24 (1960). 
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industry (although not without considerable objection from private 
power producers) or public power authorities, but it would be diffi-
cult to develop any comparative standard for reforestation, flood 
control, and many other activities. It is traditional to compare per-
formance of the British nationalized industries with the same indus-
tries before nationalization, but this comparison may be unfair in 
failing to take account of general progress in industry; and, it is 
nearly impossible to draw meaningful comparisons between these 
industries and other totally different industries that have not been 
nationalized. 
That the TV A has been remarkably successful in achieving its 
purposes can hardly be seriously disputed at this date, notwithstand-
ing doubts about standards of comparison. In thirty years, its system 
of river control has averted flood damage of more than one-third of 
a billion dollars, at a saving of some $140 million even after 
all capital and operating costs of flood control are deducted.165 TVA 
saves shippers nearly $30 million annually by maintaining a ship-
ping channel, and its early optimistic forecasts of river traffic 
have been substantially exceeded.166 Achievements in electric power 
generation are the most impressive: TVA has met heavy power 
demands for defense, industry, and home use. Average residential 
use of electricity in the valley is over twice the national average, and 
cost per kilowatt-hour (including a return of more than four per 
cent to the government on its entire power investment) is less than 
half the nationwide average.167 The power investment of the govern-
ment, as we have noted, is gradually being repaid, and the govern-
ment is being paid a return on this investment as well. Achievements 
in the development and use of new fertilizers, forest development, 
munitions, and regional employment have been similarly impres-
sive.168 It would be erroneous to suggest that corporate form caused 
TVA to be successful. By the same token, there can be little doubt 
that greater fiscal autonomy, freedom of personnel policy, and inde-
165. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTIIORITY, ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1966); Martin, The Ten-
nessee Valley Authority: A Study of Federal Control, 22 LAW &: CONTEMP. PROB. 351, 
361-62 (1957). 
166. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT I (1966); Martin, supra note 
165, at 362. 
167. Average cost per kilowatt-hour in 1966 was .90¢, contrasted with the national 
average of 2.22¢. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTIIORITY, ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1966). Some por-
tion of TVA's lower costs, however, result from its lower cost of raising capital and 
its reduced tax burden. Taxes and interest together amount to nearly one-third of the 
power revenues of private power companies. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, ANNUAL 
REPORT 206-07 (1967). 
168. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTIIORITY, ANNUAL REPORT 3, 7-11 (1966); Martin, supra 
note 165, at 365-70. 
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pendence from detailed government control have contributed im-
portantly to the initiative, flexibility, and sense of mission that have 
led to TVA's successes.169 
The job of taking over and remaking an existing industry in 
unhappy straits is obviously more difficult than the task posed by an 
operation started with a clean slate. Without detracting from the 
significance of TV A's performance, it should be obvious that the job 
of the nationalized industries-and the task to be faced by any re-
organized Po~t Office-must be considerably more difficult. The 
nationalized industries have not fared as well as TV A. Their record 
is inconclusive, and some claim that their performance on the whole 
has been uninspired, 170 perhaps to some extent because they have had 
(by virtue of the substantial governmental control previously noted) 
little of the free rein that has characterized TVA.171 In several re-
spects, the industries have done quite well: the airlines (BOAC and 
BEA) have provided generally good service; production, working 
conditions, and wages have improved significantly in the coal mines 
since nationalization; and nationalized electricity has turned in a 
remarkably effective and efficient record. Gas operations show a 
mixed record: production is efficient but sales are disappointing, 
due in part-it is claimed by some-to underpricing and over-
utilization of electricity.172 Finally, the British Transport Commis-
sion produced enormous deficits regularly, caused directly by govern-
ment intervention in prices; the lack of any degree of commercial 
freedom given to the railroads led to disastrous results. Ultimately, 
the Commission was abolished in a decentralization program and 
over-all control was vested in the Minister of Transport.173 
No study definitively establishes a causal relationship between 
autonomy and efficiency, but the public corporations examined above, 
together with the United States Post Office, afford some empirical 
support for a conclusion that most businessmen would derive from 
169. "The freedom and flexibility given to the Directors of TVA in the organic 
Act and the responsible exercise of that authority by the Board have been major factors 
in the achievements of TVA in carrying out its assigned responsibilities." Letter, supra 
note 156. 
170. Davies, Who Decides the Public Interest?, in THE LEssoNs OF PUBUC ENTERPRISE 
243-44 (M. Shanks ed. 1963); Shanks, The Future of Public Enterprise, in THE LEss0NS 
OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 300 (M. Shanks ed. 1963). 
171. See Shanks, Islands of Socialism, in THE LEssONS OF PUBUC ENTERPRISE 219-20 
(M. Shanks ed. 1963). 
172. ROBSON, supra note 164, at 436-46. 
173. Four public authorities and a holding company took the place of the British 
Transport Commission. Responsibility for rail transportation is now divided among 
six regional boards. Transport Act of 1962, 10 & 11 Eliz. 2, c. 46, §§ 1, 2, 29; see Shanks, 
The Aims and the Problems, in THE LEssoNs OF Puauc ENTERPRISE 30-31 (M. Shanks 
ed. 1963); ROBSON, supra note 164, at 150-54, 456. 
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common sense. Efficiency in conducting whatever task is assigned 
tends to suffer as the alternative courses of action and the freedom of 
choice of the managers are limited. Parliament and the Cabinet min-
isters have less information, less time, and less ability to determine 
rail rates consistent with break-even operation than the managers 
of the railroads. Political advisors cannot and do not pick local 
postmasters to maximize the efficiency of the Post Office Department, 
and Congress cannot, in the first instance, do as effective a job of 
choosing a location for a dam or power plant as TVA experts. To be 
sure, many such decisions may involve issues of the public interest, 
and some may demand review or even initiation by the legislature. 
At some point, however, performance is compromised by excessive 
intervention; and it seems clear that the formula for facilitating the 
carrying out of the industry's job is maximum autonomy consistent 
with the maintenance of overriding public policy.174 That the Post 
Office does not fit this formula hardly needs elaboration. 
In generalizing from these illustrations, some caution is in order. 
Use of the corporate form, as such, will not assure success nor even 
necessarily facilitate it. The powers and control structure of the en-
terprise determine its ability to carry on whatever purposes have 
been entrusted to it. If anything clear emerges from these histories, 
it is that vesting an organization with appropriate powers can in fact 
facilitate-through greater autonomy, creativity, and flexibility-
more effective performance of its job. Without adequate controls, 
a public corporation might act contrary to the public interest; with 
overly tight limitations, the corporate device becomes largely useless 
and the organization loses whatever added effectiveness autonomy 
can provide. 
It will be argued by some that all, or nearly all, of the virtues of a 
public postal corporation can be achieved by reorganization without 
a corporation. Obviously that is true. The common law could have 
fared well with a limited-liability, perpetual-life, delegated-responsi-
bility, transferable-share partnership in the place of the corporation. 
The corporate device institutionalizes these characteristics as well as 
others, and the public corporation in the same way affords an institu-
tional framework to which the desired characteristics may be attached. 
It might also be true that the symbolic act of establishing a new 
174. This position was explicitly adopted by the British Select Committee on Na-
tionalised Industries in their recommendations concerning government control of 
the proposed British postal corporation. The Committee rejected increased government 
control based on historical reasons or on notions of unusual monopoly position, and 
favored vesting initial authority over rates in the corporation. SELEcr Cm,u.mTEE REPORT 
194-97. 
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entity would lend impetus to the reorganization effort. Reorganiza-
tion could indeed be carried out without a corporation, but the job 
would be more difficult. 
IV. THE POST OFFICE AS A PUBLIC CORPORATION 
A. The Background of the Corporation Proposal 
The genesis of the present round of discussions concerning in-
corporating the Post Office was a proposal made last April by Post-
master General Lawrence O'Brien in a Washington address to a 
meeting of magazine editors and publishers.175 Claiming that the Post 
Office Department had grmvn in self-destructive ways, he concluded: 
[T]here are so many existing and formidable barriers to efficient 
management that the ultimate solution to the problems of the 
postal service lies in taking the Department out of its present con-
text entirely .... This is a situation that has grown up over such 
a long period of time and has such a strong tradition, that the only 
effective action I foresee is s,veeping it away entirely. 
O'Brien's proposal is sweeping, and at least a few of its points have 
been the subject of considerable dispute. He proposes that the 
Postal Service should: 
(1) cease to be a part of the President's Cabinet; 
(2) become a nonprofit government corporation, rendering essential 
· public service; 
(3) provide postal services authorized by the Congress; 
(4) be operated by a board of directors, appointed by the President, 
and confirmed by the Congress; 
(5) be managed by a professional executive appointed by the board; 
(6) be given a clear mandate on the percentage of cost coverage for 
postal services, so that further revisions in rates-should they 
be necessary-would be made on a fixed formula basis. 
His proposal seems to contemplate as well exemption from the civil 
service system for he envisions payment of employees according to 
the standards of comparable industry, with greater scope for collec-
tive bargaining. Finally, he suggests the possibility of bond financing 
for the construction of post office buildings. 
That the Postmaster General's proposal had been carefully con-
sidered by the Executive Branch was obvious: within five days, the 
President established a Commission on Postal Organization with 
the following broad mandate: 
175. Address by Postmaster General Lawrence O'Brien Before a Meeting of the 
Magazine Publishers Ass'n and the American Soc'y of Magazine Editors, April 3, 1967. 
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[The Commission shall] study the organization and structure of the 
postal service of the United States, and ... determine and report 
upon the feasibility and desirability of a transfer of the postal 
service from the Post Office Department to a Government corporation, 
or such other form of organization as the Commission may con-
sider desirable.11a 
The Commission is directed to consider organization and manage-
ment, rates, compensation, personnel practices, financing, and mod-
ernization, among other factors. Any recommendation against a 
transfer to a government corporation or other form of organization 
must be accompanied by reasons and by alternative proposed im-
provements; a recommendation in favor of a transfer must include 
consideration of the nature and relationship of the organization to 
the President, the Congress, and the public. In addition, recom-
mendations must be made concerning composition and appointment 
of top management, methods of setting postal rates, compensation, 
employment policies and labor relations, transportation, financing, 
and any other relevant issues. The Commission was given one year 
to prepare a final report. Its ten members, chaired by Frederick 
Kappel (former chairman of the board of American Telephone & 
Telegraph Company), reflect the magnitude of its task: they include 
the Dean of the Harvard Business School, the Board Chairman or 
President of five major corporations, the Vice-President of the Ford 
Foundation, a distinguished Washington attorney, and the President 
of the AFL-CIO. 
This proposal to consider reorganization of the Post Office as 
a public corporation is not ·without precedent. The German Federal 
Post, though not technically established as a body corporate, has at 
least a few of the attributes of a corporation.177 Moreover, the Post-
master General's proposal was preceded by a British White Paper 
outlining the impending change of status of the British Post Office 
to a public corporation.178 Finally, the 1949 Hoover Commission 
Report, though generally viewed as favoring less autonomy for public 
corporations,170 nevertheless recommended use of at least some of the 
attributes of such an organization (such as a revolving fund and a 
business-type budget) for the Post Office.180 Still, the organization 
176. Exec. Order No. 11341, 32 Fed. Reg. 5765 (April 8, 1967). 
177. The Bundespost is administered by a federal minister, but its board sets postal 
rates, budgets, and major technical plans. It is a self-supporting special fund. See 
Friedmann & Hufnagel, The Public Corporation in Various States: Germany, in THE 
PunLic CORPORATION 159-60 (W. Friedmann ed. 1954). 
178. REORGANISATION OF THE POST OFFICE, CMND. No. 3233 (1967). 
179. See, e.g., Hanson, Regional Survey: North America, in PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 
34-35 (A. Hanson ed. 1954). 
180. 1949 HOOVER COMMISSION, THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT 11-14. 
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proposed by the Postmaster General is in many ways unique. For 
aside from long history as a government department and sheer size-
the United States Post Office dwarfs that of any other country-in-
corporation of the Post Office would follow hard on the heels of 
developing governmental distrust of public corporations and a sharp 
decline in their use in the United States. 
In the period before World War II, the use of public corpora-
tions by the federal government increased substantially; by 1945 the 
General Accounting Office counted some fifty-eight federal corpora-
tions or groups of corporations of various types.181 The proliferation 
of these corporations was due in large part to the desire for greater 
autonomy in operations and also in part to attempts to avoid un-
certainty of congressional action in the establishment of a new 
agencies.182 With the onset of the war, Congress paid greater attention 
to these corporations and began the process of chipping away at their 
autonomy. The Ramspeck Act of 1940 drew the employees of every 
federal government corporation, with the exception of TV A, into the 
classified civil service.183 Then in 1941, Congress established the 
Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expendi-
tures, which reported in 1944 on government corporations, recom-
mending that: 
(I) the corporations be required to present a business-type budget 
to the Bureau of the Budget; 
(!) the budget be submitted to Congress, and acted upon as Congress 
acts on appropriations; 
(3) the General Accounting Office be given authority to audit the 
corporations; and 
(4) the Comptroller General of the United States be made auditor 
and comptroller, ex officio, of every government corporation. 
This last recommendation was not agreed to by the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the Director of the Budget, and it was not included 
in the bill drafted in response to the report.184 Nevertheless, the 
initial bills introduced185 would virtually have eliminated all mean-
ingful freedom of action, with the following language: 
181. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REFERENCE MANUAL OF GOVERNMENT CORPORA· 
TIONS III, s. Doc. No. 86, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). 
182. See Pritchett, The Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, 40 Allf. POL. 
Ser. R.Ev. 495, 496 (1946). 
183. 5 U.S.C. § 631a (1964) authorized the President of the United States to cover 
such employees by Executive Order. This was done under Exec. Order No. 8743, as 
amended, 5 U.S.C. § 631a (1964). 
184. JOINT COllfM. ON REDUCTION OF NONESSENTIAL FEDERAL EXPENDITURES, REPORT ON 
GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS, s. Doc. No. 227, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1944). 
185. Three identical bills were introduced: S. 469, H.R. 2051, and H.R. 2177, 79th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). 
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Sec. 104. No wholly owned Government corporation shall transact 
' any business in any fiscal year except such business as is authorized 
by Act of Congress as a part of its budget program for such fiscal 
year, and no expenditures for administrative expenses in any fiscal 
year shall be made by any such corporation except in the amounts 
authorized and made available by Congress for such fiscal year. No 
funds so made available by the Congress for administrative ex-
penses shall be obligated or expended unless and until an appropria-
tion account shall have been established therefore pursuant to an 
appropriation warrant or a covering warrant, and funds so made 
available shall be subject to apportionment by the Bureau of the 
Budget, and claims and accounts thereunder to adjustment and 
settlement by the General Accounting Office under title III of the 
Budget and Accounting Act, 1921. 
The limitations of this section-fiscal year budgeting and settlement 
of accounts by the General Accounting Office-as noted by witnesses 
at hearings on the bills, would have rendered impossible businesslike 
operations of the corporations.186 The revised bill specifically took 
account of the corporations' demand for a degree of fiscal auton-
omy: 1s1 
Sec. 104. The Budget programs transmitted by the President to 
the Congress shall be considered and, if necessary, legislation shall 
be enacted making available such funds or other financial resources 
as the Congress may determine. The provisions of this section shall 
not be construed as preventing wholly owned Government corpora-
tions from carrying out and financing their activities as authorized 
by existing law, nor shall any provisions of this section be construed 
as affecting in any way the provisions of section 26 of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority Act, as amended. The provisions of this section 
shall not be construed as affecting the existing authority of any wholly 
owned Government corporation to make contracts or other commit-
ments without reference to fiscal year limitations. 
While this section as enacted did not, therefore, impose fiscal year 
limitations on the corporations, the Government Corporation Con-
trol Act of 1945,188 of which it formed a part, sufficiently restricted 
186. Hearings on S. 469 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and 
Currency, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (David Lilienthal, Chairman of the Board of TVA), 
122 CToseph Mehaffey, President of the Panama Railroad Company) (1945). See Pritchett, 
supra note 182, at 498-99, 501. 
187. H.R. 3660, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); see H.R. REP. No. 856, 79th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 3 (1945). Note that § 26 of the TVA Act is 16 U.S.C. § 83ly (1964), effectively 
permitting the TV A to use its receipts for the carrying on of its programs. 
188. 31 U.S.C. §§ 841-69 (1964). Note that a 1947 amendment to the Act changed the 
quoted section to allow Congress to place limitations on the use of corporate funds as 
well as appropriations: "legislation shall be enacted making necessary appropriations, 
as may be authorized by law, making available for expenditure for operating and ad-
ministrative expenses such corporate funds or other financial resources or limiting the 
use thereof as the Congress may determine •••• " 31 U.S.C. § 849 (1964) (emphasis 
added). 
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the freedom of public corporations that one contemporary authority 
claimed that "the pattern of control imposed means that, for good or 
ill, American experience with autonomous public corporations is 
substantially at an end."189 
Though Congress may obviously exempt any postal corporation 
from the Government Corporation Control Act-TV A is exempted 
from parts of that Act and the Ramspeck Act190-an examination of 
the nature of the Act's controls is useful in determining the usual 
ground rules for government corporations, for which it may be ex-
pected Congress will argue if any postal reorganization is proposed. 
The focus of the Act is exclusively financial: it deals with budgeting, 
audits, and debt financing. The budget provisions, though they do 
not tie expenditures to fiscal years, do require all wholly owned gov-
ernment corporations, including those that are totally self-supporting, 
to present annual budgets for congressional consideration.191 In 
prescribing a business-type budget, Congress recognized the difference 
in function between these corporations and government departments 
and, implicitly, the legitimacy of the corporate device to carry out 
the business-type operations of the government; but these sections 
were intended to, and did, curtail fiscal autonomy. The provi-
sions for audit by the General Accounting Office similarly represent 
a compromise: control was increased, but to a level significantly lower 
than that exercised over government departments. Particularly signifi-
cant was deletion of "settlement authority" of the General Account-
ing Office as proposed in the initial bills; this paralleled the outcome 
of the General Accounting Office dispute with the TV A on this issue, 
previously discussed.192 The General Accounting Office is to perform 
annual audits "in accordance with the principles and procedures 
applicable to commercial corporate transactions" and report to 
Congress thereon.193 Finally, the Control Act vests control over debt 
financing of government corporations in the Secretary of the Treas-
ury.194 This absolute power-which might be exercised by the 
Treasury, for example in a period of financial stress, to the clear detri-
189. Pritchett, supra note 182, at 509. 
190. 5 U.S.C. § 631a (1964) specifically excludes TVA from civil service coverage. The 
limitations of § 104 of the Government Corporation Control Act are similarly inap-
plicable to TVA [31 U.S.C. § 849 (1964)); and the prohibition against private audits of 
31 U.S.C. § 866(d) (1964) is expressly negated in the TVA Act, 16 U.S.C. § 83ln-4(c) 
(1964). 
191. 31 u.s.c. §§ 847-49 (1964). 
192. See text accompanying note 160 supra. 
193. 31 u.s.c. § 850-51 (1964). 
194. 31 u.s.c. § 868 (1964). 
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ment of the corporation-should be contrasted with the clearly 
limited veto given the Treasury in TV A bond financing.195 
Autonomy was clearly limited in the fiscal area by the Government 
Corporation Control Act, and the Ramspeck Act limited corporate 
freedom over personnel policy. It remains to be determined whether 
these elements of autonomy, or others, are critical to an efficient 
postal operation, and whether exemption from aspects of these acts 
will be necessary. 
B. Details of a Postal Corporation 
It is beyond the purview of this Article, and perhaps beyond the 
capabilities of any before-the-fact study, to prescribe with precision 
the details of a reorganization plan for the Post Office. Accordingly, 
this analysis will be concerned with a few of the most fundamental 
issues that any such reorganization must consider: distribution of 
control between Congress and the proposed corporation, personnel 
policies, and finance. 
I. Management and Control 
The propos1t1on that organizational efficiency will increase if 
rules which preclude desirable courses of conduct are eliminated 
needs little proof. Many of the rules under which the Post Office now 
operates are archaic and unduly restrictive,196 and if reorganization 
does nothing but eliminate these rules it will have made a step 
forward. Beyond the elimination of undesirable restrictions, however, 
there is a major institutional effect of distributing control more 
widely throughout an enterprise. Though an occasional voice has 
been raised against the view that autonomy in business-type opera-
tions of the government is desirable,197 both history and empirical 
research put its desirability beyond doubt. Freedom from many de-
tails of government control has characterized the highly successful 
operations of TV A, government corporations in many nations, and 
195. 16 U.S.C. § 83ln-4(c) (1964) gives TVA power to set terms, rates, and conditions 
of its obligations. The Secretary of the Treasury must receive fifteen days' notice of 
proposed issuance of obligations with a term of one year or more. If the Secretary does 
not approve the issue-he may pass only on the time of issuance and the maximum 
interest rate-the Treasury must provide interim financing to TVA up to $150 million. 
If agreement on issuance is not then reached within eight months, TVA may sell 
bonds without Treasury approval. 
196. See, e.g., text accompanying note 63 supra. 
197. See, e.g., Seidman, The Theory of the Autonomous Government Corporation: 
4. Critical Appraisal, 12 PUB. AD. REv. 89, 93-96 (1952). 
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local authorities in the United States.198 While it is difficult to de-
velop adequate theoretical measures of organizational effectiveness, 
several recent studies have found a significant correlation between 
the total control and its distribution in an organization and the 
effectiveness of that organization.199 The "participative management" 
advocates have produced impressive demonstrations of the favorable 
organizational effects, over time, of moving from authoritative man-
agement toward greater participation in decision-making by lower-
level employees.200 Studies such as these suggest the potentiality of 
increasing the effectiveness of the Post Office by giving it greater 
control over its operations and by allowing for the delegation of that 
authority to a far greater extent than at present. 
Control given to a postal corporation must, regardless of what 
efficiency may demand, be limited by national policy. There is never-
theless a vast amount of freedom of action-so far withheld 
-that can be afforded in the running of the postal system by 
eliminating political appointments below cabinet level, by granting 
freedom of choice in the location of new post offices, by allowing 
greater freedom in transportation policy and contracting, and by re-
ducing unnecessarily detailed controls over local operations. Even 
some politically tinged powers, such as setting of postal rates, bond 
financing authority, and possible exemption from civil service laws, 
can to some measure be granted to the corporation without com-
promising genuine national interests. 
Although a board of directors is not essential to a public corpora-
tion, it is a fixture of private corporations, and it serves functions 
of a value not to be ignored by the Post Office.201 Inside, full-time 
198. See generally THE PUBLIC CORPORATION (W. Friedmann ed. 1954); PUBLIC 
ENTERPrusE (A. Hanson ed. 1954). 
199. See Marcus &: Cafagna, Control in Modern Organizations 25 Pun. AD. REv. 121 
(1965). 
200. A landmark work is R. LIKERT, NEW PATTERNS OF MANAGEMENT (1961), the 
themes of which are developed in greater depth in R. LIKERT, THE HUMAN ORGA• 
NIZATION (1967). Likert finds that as management systems move from "System I" (ex• 
ploitative-authoritative) to "System 4" (participative group) they tend to be more 
productive and have lower costs and more favorable attitudes. Id. at 46. Moreover, 
such variables as group loyalty, conflicts, motivation, and pressures are directly affected 
by the management system. Id. at 75-77. A detailed study of two companies, generally 
supporting Likert's thesis, is A. MARROW, D. BOWERS &: s. SEASHORE, MANAGEMENT BY 
PARTICIPATION (1967). Doubts have been expressed concerning the universal application 
of the "participative management" approach, particularly as to low-level employees 
or old-line companies, but its effects have already been felt widely. See Albrook, 
Participative Management: Time for a Second Look, FORTUNE, May 1967, at 166. 
201. Among the most important of these are selection of executives, development 
of corporate policy, and evaluation of performance. And while there is as much varia-
tion among boards as among business managers, the continuing functions of the board 
in these areas have strongly affected the success of business enterprises. The consensus 
among businessmen, at least, is that a capable and devoted board of directors is a 
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members of the board set major policy and act as an internal control 
on effectiveness; outside, part-time members-if they do their jobs 
conscientiously-afford the corporation a diversity of views.202 To 
these virtues, in the public corporation setting, is added the ad-
vantage of another layer of political insulation. If the President of 
the United States names the board, and the board in turn names the 
executives, as is the case in TV A, the executives are more likely to be 
chosen for their ability to manage as opposed to their political at-
tractiveness.203 It would be naive to suggest that political factors 
would play no part in the naming of the board, but staggered terms of 
a relatively substantial period would prevent the operation of a 
complete spoils system and would also provide necessary continuity 
of experience and knowledge. Experience shows that the nonpolitical 
aspect of such a board would tend to be preserved by avoiding any 
provision that its members be named in stated proportions from each 
political party.204 In addition, the board should not include members 
of the executive departments or ex officio members, such as the 
Comptroller General.205 Moreover, whatever controls are necessary 
can as effectively be imposed by statute or regulation. Whether the 
board should be large or small, full-time or part-time, and repre-
sentative or not are important issues. Communications Satellite 
Corporation, probably most accurately classified as a publicly 
sponsored, regulated private corporation, has a representative board; 
its fifteen members are named six by vote of the common-carrier 
very valuable business asset. See, e.g., the case studies in J. BAKER, DIRECTORS AND 
THEIR FUNCTIONS (1945) and the subsequent Harvard Business School Study, M. COPE· 
LAND &: A. TOWL, THE BOARD OF DIREcrORS AND BUSINESS 1:lANAGEIIIENT (1947). 
202. The longstanding dispute among corporate executives as to the relative value 
of "inside" and "outside" directors-those who devote full time to the board's activities, 
as contrasted with those for whom directorship is not an exclusive occupation-shows 
no sign of abating. Arguments in favor of outside directors center on the virtues of 
obtaining an outside, objective view of business affairs. The influence of outside direc-
tors is reduced to a substantial degree, however, by their inability to obtain full in-
formation on the operations of the corporation. See THE DIRECTOR LooKs AT HIS JoB 
38-101 (C. Brown &: E. Smith ed. 1957). The only systematic study of the relationship 
between corporate performance and the nature of the board of directors adduces per-
suasive evidence for its conclusion that inside-run directorates produce better corporate 
performance than outside-run boards. s. VANCE, BOARDS OF DIRECTORS: STRUCTURE AND 
PERFORIIIANCE 1-3, 44-61 (1964). 
203. Note that the day-to-day affairs of TV A are under the direction of a General 
Manager, appointed by the board. Early attempts to have the board assume direction of 
both policy and operations were unsuccessful. See text accompanying notes 131-34 supra. 
204. Such a provision tends to polarize the board, rather than to assure impartiality. 
See J. THURSTON, GOVERNMENT PROPRIETARY CORPORATIONS IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING 
COUNTRIES 159-61 (1937). 
205. Canadian public corporations have used this device, with strong critical dis-
favor. Hodgetts, The Public Corporation in Various States: Canada, in THE PUBLIC 
CORPORATION 75-78 (W. Friedmann ed. 1954). 
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shareholders, six by vote of public shareholders, and three by ap-
pointment by the President of the United States.206 This attempt to 
reflect various constituencies on the board has been sharply criticized 
on theoretical and historical grounds, 207 and has the additional fault 
of being contrary to the theory of a board as acting in the best 
interests of the corporation and not individual constituents.208 While 
part-time board members may bring useful perspectives to the new 
corporation, it will be essential-at least at the outset-that a nucleus 
of members be prepared to devote their full efforts to reorganization, 
which only begins with the establishment of a corporation. Thus, a 
board composed predominantly of full-time members appears de-
sirable, probably no larger than necessary to assure continuity. A 
nine-man board, with staggered terms, would be consistent with the 
practice of the public corporations discussed earlier. 200 
The board of the new British postal corporation will report to 
the Postmaster General, a Cabinet official, in the same manner as the 
boards of the nationalized industries.210 By contrast, direct account-
ability to Congress by public corporations in the United States avoids 
the need for retention of such ministerial responsibility; indeed, 
Postmaster General O'Brien's proposal contemplated the elimination 
of his job.211 Moreover, the critical public interest aspects of postal 
operations-type, distribution and frequency of service, postal rates, 
and finances-can, to the extent necessary, be made the subject of 
specific statutory criteria without the need for continued cabinet-
level intervention in the details of operations. 
Is a board of directors essential, or merely desirable? Top-level 
executive continuity is desirable, though perhaps not critical. But 
insulation from political patronage and other influences unrelated 
to postal operations, together with freedom from detailed control 
over operations, is critical to any viable reorganization. Without a 
board of directors and the insulation it gives to officers of the postal 
service, a fixed-term Postmaster General might be a possible alterna-
tive, but a poor one: a chief executive subject to removal for political 
206. This is so provided in the articles of incorporation, as required by 47 U.S.C. 
§ 733 (1964). See CoMN!UNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, PROSPEcrus 33-35 (1964). 
207. See Schwartz, Governmentally Appointed Directors in a Private Corporation-
The Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 79 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 350, 363-64 (1965). 
208. See 3 w. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 848 (1965); cf. Rostow, 
To Whom and for What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible?, in THE COR· 
PORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46 (E. Mason ed. 1961). 
209. A board of between five and fifteen members is large enough to assure diver-
sity of outlook and experience without frustrating effective discussion. Cf. ROBSON, 
supra note 164, at 213-15. 
210. REORGANIZATION OF THE POST OFFICE, CMND. No. 3233, at 9 (1967). 
211. See text accompanying note 175 supra. 
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reasons cannot maintain autonomy. A board of directors would 
assure necessary autonomy and political insulation, as well as desir-
able division between policy formation and its execution; it is an 
essential element of any reorganization. 
2. Personnel 
The Ramspeck Act would require that all employees of a postal 
corporation be within the classified civil service in the absence of a 
statutory exemption.212 Ironically, the goals of the civil service laws-
elimination of nepotism and political influence, and emphasis on 
merit-have in large part been perverted in the present Post Office 
Department. Some specific reforms could eliminate the major short-
comings; at least a few of the proposed bills to eliminate political 
appointment of postmasters would tend to eliminate deleterious 
political influences generally, and help to provide hope of advance-
ment for postal employees.213 Unfortunately, the problem does not 
stop there: remaining are the difficulties of uniform nationwide pay 
scales, impediments to transfer from office to office, and the inability 
of the Department to attract university trained potential managers 
and executives.214 While some of these problems can be mitigated by 
changing Post Office Department regulations, most of them stem 
from requirements of the civil service laws themselves. Exemption 
from these laws is unusual, but not entirely without precedent: TV A, 
exempted from the Ramspeck Act, has developed a personnel system 
that has proved remarkably successful.215 Not the least of the ad-
vantages of this system has been the opportunity it provides-not-
withstanding the bar against strikes-for genuine collective bargain-
ing based on local wage scales, with the high degree of satisfaction this 
has provided both management and labor.216 
Generalizing from TV A in this area has its dangers: the esprit 
of that organization began with its initial organization and to some 
degree results from the recognition by both labor and management 
that they are an example for others. There is a vested interest in ami-
cable relations, which no doubt affects negotiations favorably. Never-
212. 5 U.S.C. § 631a (1964). 
213. See text accompanying notes 83-85 supra. 
214. See text accompanying notes 12-22 supra. 
215. The TVA Act provides only that the Board shall select all employees, and 
that no political tests shall be applied. 16 U.S.C. §§ 831b, (1964). TVA has de-
veloped comprehensive regulations pursuant to this statutory grant, consistent with 
the nature of its operations. TENNESSEE VALLEY -AUTIIORITY, ADMINISTRATIVE RELEASES 
§ III (1967). 
216. Thompson, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service-The T.V .A. Experi-
ence and Its Implications for Other Government Agencies, 17 LAB. L.J. 89 (1966). 
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theless, it is important to recognize that TV A's personnel policy 
represents an adaptation of the essentials of the civil service system to 
the details of TV A's operation by allowing local wage rates, hiring on 
the spot, and individualized hiring and supervision. And while 
uniformity has its virtues, there seems little reason why it must prevail 
over demonstrably different needs of a particular organization. So 
with the Post Office: let it be granted that any organization for the 
carrying on of United States government functions should assure a 
fair, merit-based system of employment, advancement, and firing. 
Does such a policy require, for example, that a nation-wide business-
type enterprise pay uniform wages, even if those wages make employ-
ment unattractive in some areas and a political plum in others?217 
Local wage differentials are a matter of some sensitivity to organized 
labor, but should not the issue be resolved by concentrated genuine 
wage negotiations, rather than a restrictive and obviously unsuitable 
statutory and regulatory scheme? 
Labor relations must be the subject of another study, but a few 
points should be noted. The Post Office as a national communications 
network under over-all government control may not be able to risk 
the threat of a strike. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine Congress 
granting the right to strike under even the most liberal reorganization 
plan. Nevertheless, some effective collective bargaining technique 
must be developed, and although TVA has produced an enviable 
labor relations record within the strike ban, a device such as compul-
sory arbitration binding on both parties may be essential to the Post 
Office. Though no suggestion is offered herein, it must be recog-
nized that if an approach like compulsory arbitration is adopted it 
must appear in the corporation's charter and should therefore be 
considered along with other elements of the reorganization plan. 
Executives or managers are a second problem, and here the issue 
is not area differentials, but flexibility in hiring, advancement, and 
transfers. To some degree, the Department itself has been responsible 
for creating a staid and unattractive image by offering little oppor-
tunity for either experienced managers or university graduates, and 
by itself limiting transfers. Although the Department has taken some 
first steps to change this pattern, more are required.218 Attracting pro-
fessional managers, engineers, and attorneys in the numbers needed 
by the Post Office will require competitive starting salaries and work-
ing conditions, opportunities for substantial advancement commen-
surate with demonstrated ability, and possibly even compensation 
217. See note 12 supra. 
218. See note 18 supra. 
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comparable to private industry positions of equal stature. These are 
not within the possibilities of civil service employers: private industry 
spirits away top executives by offering them substantial compensa-
tion and therefore holds them to a high standard of performance. 
How can the Post Office expect to achieve similar performance when 
it is limited to top pay of $27,900 in postal field positions, where 
enormous job security is coupled with no upward mobility?219 And, 
more important, what overriding national policy demands these 
limitations? Perhaps it would be uneconomic to have different statu-
tory standards applicable to each government department or enter-
prise. But the Post Office is not just another department. It is the 
government's largest civilian employer, and second in size only to the 
armed forces, which have a separate personnel policy.220 
Is exemption from the civil service laws essential, or merely opera-
tionally desirable? Clearly, elimination of political perversion of the 
civil service system as it applies to the Post Office221 is absolutely 
essential, for without that reform the Post Office remains the un-
·willing depositary of political favors. It is this observer's view that 
exemption from the civil service is essential, at least for managerial 
employees. Critics will respond by noting that other government 
agencies, equally limited by the civil service pay scales, experience 
requirements, and the like, have had no difficulty attracting talent. 
This argument tends to stretch the truth. Top flight professionals 
are attracted to certain government positions, but they tend to stay 
only a few years, obtain needed experience, and move on to the 
private sector. Government does have difficulty at least in retaining 
talent. Moreover, the talent is attracted to "glamor" jobs. Top law 
graduates flock to the Justice Department, the Defense Department, 
and other loci of power and influence. They do not seek out the 
Post Office, and even with the added attraction that a major reorga-
nization might afford, they would not form lines at the hiring office. 
The Post Office is not the White House. It is not at the center of 
national policy, it makes little news, and it must therefore compete 
219. Effective July I, 1968, the top salary in the Postal Field Service (grade PFS-21) 
will be $27,900. H.R. 7977, § 3542, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The Department is 
limited to fifty-five employees in the top two PFS grades. Id. § 3301. (Positions at 
Department headquarters in Washington are within the General Schedule and Execu• 
tive Schedule pay rates.) The gap between executive-level salaries in the Civil Service 
and those in private industry is documented in Hearings on H.R. 8261 and Related 
Bills Before the Subcomm. on Compensation of the House Comm. on Post Office and 
Civil Service, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 90-15, at 29-30, 36-37 (1967). 
220. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATlSTICAL .AllSTRAcr OF THE UNITED 
STAn:s 408-09 (1967). 
221. See NATIONAL CML SERVICE LEAGUE, Poucy STATEMENT! ABANDONING PATRON· 
AGE IN POSTAL APPOINTMENTS (1966). 
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with private industry by paying competitive salaries and offering 
comparable advancement opportunities. This it cannot do under the 
present laws. As to nonmanagerial positions, the TV A example shows 
that meaningful collective bargaining on wages and working con-
ditions, together with a degree of flexibility in labor relations, can 
assist in evoking a sense of participation and creating loyalty among 
the entire work force, notwithstanding the government ban against 
strikes. Perhaps this is not essential, but the importance of a joint 
management-labor sense of mission during a period of upheaval and 
change in technology cannot be overemphasized. Exemption from 
civil service, subject to statutory requirements concerning merit 
standards and due process in personnel administration, avoidance of 
political interference, and the usual strike ban would facilitate 
progress throughout the postal system. 
3. Finance 
It is in the area of finance-rate structure, capital expenditures, 
borrowing, budgets, and auditing-that freedom of action tends to 
be most critical and most controversial. It has regularly been as-
sumed that postal rates are of such great national concern that they 
can only be determined by Congress. That rate structures are of pub-
lic concern is a truism; it does not follow, however, that Congress 
should-or indeed, that Congress can-set a viable structure for postal 
charges. The proposed postal corporation in England is to have statu-
tory power to set rates, subject to applicable nationwide legislation 
on prices and incomes, with provision for consultation with a users' 
council on major rate changes.222 Rates set by the corporation, though 
considered by the users' council and subject to review by Parliament, 
are therefore not originally set by the legislature. Similarly, United 
States telephone rates, no less a matter of public interest than postal 
charges, are established initially by the telephone companies, subject 
to regulation by the Federal Communications Commission and local 
utilities commissions. Clearly, no postal corporation could be allowed 
to set rates without supervision; its monopoly position and the public 
interest preclude such a scheme. But it is difficult to see what objec-
tion could be posed, on public interest grounds, to giving initiative 
to the postal corporation to submit a rate structure, subject to modifi-
cation by Congress on the basis of demonstrated public interest. Giv-
ing the corporation initial authority to set proposed rates-subject 
to broad statutory guidelines on rate policy-thus has two virtues: 
222. REORGANIZATION OF THE POST OFFICE, CMND. No. 3233, at 6·7 (1967); see SEU:cr 
COMMITTEE REPORT 195-97. 
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it allows submission of a rate structure based on operational con-
siderations, and it requires that Congress justify publicly any varia-
tion therefrom. If second-class mail rates, for example, are to be 
maintained at a nonremunerative level by congressional interven-
tion, Congress must make changes in the rates submitted by the 
corporation and be prepared to justify those changes, together with 
whatever losses--clearly identified as such-result therefrom. 
Rates cannot be discussed without opening the problem of defi-
cits, government investment, and break-even operations. The British 
nationalized industries, TV A, and numerous other public corpora-
tions are directed to break even on their business-type operations 
after repayment of a portion of the government's initial investment.223 
It has become commonplace to consider the Post Office a public 
service that cannot fit within this framework; but interestingly, the 
British Post Office operated within these strictures prior to the 
corporation proposal and will continue to do so after the corpora-
tion is organized.224 Any decision that the Post Office will be sub-
sidized means that some costs of using the mails will be borne not 
by the users, but rather by the general public as a portion of tax 
costs. Is this justified? The distribution of mail use suggests a resound-
ing no to this question. First-class mail, which according to the De-
partment's Cost Ascertainment System is not subsidized, is approxi-
mately seventy-five per cent business mail. Rate increases on this class 
affect seriously neither individual nor business users.225 Second-class 
mail, heavily subsidized by any standard,226 is invariably passed on to 
the consumer of newspapers and magazines that are mailed pursuant 
to this class. Is there any reason why magazine readers should 
pay for increased costs of paper and ink and labor-as they clearly 
223. See text accompanying notes 114 &: 153 supra. 
224. Postal operations, however, have produced deficits which have been offset by 
profitable telephone services. POST OFFICE REPORT &: ACCOUNTS 40-41 (1965). It has been 
recommended that separate financial objectives-each to require a return on invest-
ment-be established for postal and telephone services. SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT 
175-76. 
225. See note 6 supra. Most companies spend between one-tenth and one-fifth of 
one per cent of their operating expenses on first-class mail. Nonbusiness users spend an 
average of only one-tenth of one per cent of per capita disposable income on first-
class mail. Even substantial rate increases should not, therefore, significantly affect the 
users or the volume of first-class mail. l\IcKlNSEY &: Co., REPORT TO THE HOUSE COMM. 
ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE ON THE IMPACT OF POSTAL-RATE INCREASES 2-4, 
2-7 (Comm. Print 1960). 
226. See text accompanying note 46 supra. The new postal rates enacted by H.R. 
7977, which increase cost coverages of all classes, still provide only 34% cost coverage 
on regular second-class mail and 72% coverage on bulk third-class mail. It is difficult 
to find a clear rationale in the congressional deliberations for the variations in cost 
coverage, although 39 U.S.C. §§ 2301, 2302 (1964) provide general guidance on rates. 
See S. REP. No. 801, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1967). 
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have-and not increases in postage charges?227 And is there any reason 
to believe that the original rationale for the second-class subsidy, 
facilitating the spread of news to remote areas by the only available 
means, is still viable? Finally, it is difficult to understand why adver-
tisers, the primary users of third-class mail, should not pay a fair 
share of the cost of services rendered them.228 There is dispute as to 
the validity of the Department's cost accumulations on third-class 
mail,229 some suggesting that third-class mail does not even pay its 
marginal costs. 230 
Taken at its face, this evidence establishes that within broad ranges 
postal rates can be adjusted without adversely affecting the system or 
its users. The argument that the Post Office should not break even is 
barren. The Department can break even, and there is no satisfactory 
justification for preventing the costs of its services from rising when 
all other costs rise. To the extent that there is genuine justification for 
certain subsidies, such as free mail for the blind, they can as easily 
be supported directly and identifiably by a lump-sum payment from 
the Treasury. The advantage of break-even operations, which present 
attainable goals to the Department and allow careful financial 
analysis to play a role in operations, cannot be overestimated. This 
reform must be rated as essential; if Congress continues to set rates 
to produce a deficit, and the Department continues to take the blame 
for a loss not of its mm making, the genuine incentive to maximize 
efficiency in operations will forever be blunted. 
Capital expenditures and borrowing power are related. It was 
noted earlier that the Post Office's investment in research and devel-
opment and in capital improvement is inordinately small.231 Failure 
to make adequate investment in earlier periods saddles the postal 
operations of today with outdated facilities. Inability to make sub-
stantial capital improvements derives from the appropriations pro-
227. Publishers have successfully passed on to subscribers significant increases in 
other costs without substantial reduction in their profits, and with continued increases 
in circulation. From 1946 to 1957, the average subscription price of magazines in-
creased 44%, MCKINSEY & Co., supra note 225, at 2-12 through 2-17. 
228. Postage is a significant part of the cost-nearly one-third-of direct mail adver-
tising. Direct mail advertising, however, is at least ten times as expensive as advertising 
in magazines or newspapers; its use is justified by its remarkable effectiveness. Raising 
postage rates will affect only marginal operations: neither quantity of mail nor profits 
of most users will be adversely affected by most postage rate increases. MCKINSEY & Co., 
supra note 225, at 2-24 through 2-35. Past experience with rate increases supports these 
assertions. See Hearings on H.R. 7977 and H.R. 7978 Before the Subcomm. on Postal 
Rates of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 
90-14, at 21-22 (1967) (Statement of Postmaster General O'Brien). 
229. Id. at 38-39. But see id. at 49. 
230. E.g., M. BARATZ, THE ECONOMICS OF THE POSTAL SERVICE 42-43 (1962). 
231. See text accompanying note 44 supra. 
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cess: Congress has regularly failed to make substantial appropriations 
for research and capital development, and the Department has 
responded by expending little effort on developing such plans.232 The 
historical lesson is that the system of appropriations for capital 
development does not do the job. Moreover, it would be impossible 
to accumulate substantial capital funds through increases in postal 
rates, since any such increase would have to be so substantial as to 
create a public outcry and congressional intervention into rate struc-
tures. The solution to this problem is straightfonvard and well-tried: 
give the postal corporation authority to raise funds by the issuance 
of bonds. TV A has such authority, and the bonds it issues-though 
neither obligations of the United States, nor guaranteed by the Trea-
sury-are highly rated securities.233 If the postal corporation is put 
on a break-even footing, it may be possible, at least after some years 
of favorable operations, for it to sell such bonds on its own credit, 
without Treasury guaranty.234 Provision must be made for coordina-
tion with the Treasury to prevent a substantial disturbance of fiscal 
policy by the large issuance or retirement of debt at times when the 
Treasury itself is engaged in open-market operations, but a statutory 
scheme similar to TV A's bond-issuing authority seems a reasonable 
compromise.235 If the postal corporation is to be given a meaningful 
charter to develop the postal system according to the latest technol-
ogy, independence in capital financing, backed up with bond-issuing 
authority, is essential. 
Excessive control by the use of budgets and audits can negate the 
impact of any attempted reorganization. This was the basis of TV A's 
early dispute with the General Accounting Office.236 While TVA 
must prepare and submit a budget, the statute specifically authorizes 
it to spend receipts on its programs.237 By contrast, the Government 
Corporation Control Act permits Congress, when approving a sub-
232. From 1955 to 1967 total postal modernization, including investments in land, 
buildings, and mechanization, amounted to an average of less than $40 million per 
year. Proposed expenditures for the five years beginning 1968, by contrast, amount to 
$263 million annually. It remains to be seen whether Congress will appropriate such 
amounts. Hearings on Postal Modernization Before the Subcomm. on Postal Facilities 
and Modernization of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 90th Cong., 
1st Sess., ser. 90-17, pt. 1, at 34 (1967). 
233. TVA bonds are rated Aaa, the highest rating, by Moody's. MOODY, Punuc 
UTILITY MANUAL 1191-92 (1967). 
234. But cf. REORGANIZATION OF THE Posr OFFICE, CMND. No. 3233, at 7 (1967), 
permitting long-term borrowing by the new British postal corporation only from the 
government. It is arguable that a Treasury guaranty might give the corporation the 
benefit of lower interest rates. 
2!15. See note 195 supra. 
2!16. See text accompanying note 160 supra. 
2!17. 16 U.S.C. § 8!1ly (1964). 
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ject corporation's budget, to make changes therein: presumably, sub-
sequent expenditures in violation thereof would be illegal.238 It 
should be obvious that this authority, if applicable to a postal corpora-
tion, would leave open the possibility of regular intervention on 
a political basis into locations of post offices, areas to be modernized, 
and similar matters. While Congress must have ultimate control in 
the national interest, it is not clear that such control must include 
the right to change budget items not supported by appropriations in 
the absence of special justification. 
That audit authority can be equivalent to control is obvious to 
long-time observers of the General Accounting Office. When ex-
penditures are supported by appropriations, this control seems justi-
fied: Congress has no way to assure the integrity of the appropriation 
process other than audit (and disallowance) by the General Account-
ing Office. That Office has been effective in carrying out this function, 
although complaints have been heard that in so doing, it has often 
presumed to pass on issues of internal policy beyond the area of its 
expert competence.239 However, when an organization finances its 
operations through its own revenue-producing activities, as would 
be the case with break-even operation of a postal corporation, the 
function of assuring compliance with appropriation limits disappears 
and disallowance of expense items by the General Accounting Office 
becomes inappropriate. The only function of audit then becomes 
evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of the operation. Doubts 
have been expressed concerning the General Accounting Office's 
ability to perform such an audit, and it is true that many of its reports 
are more in the nature of indictments than impartial observations.240 
The Government Corporation Control Act makes abundantly clear 
its approval of such fishing expeditions for possible flaws or in-
efficiencies: 
[The audit report shall include] ... a report of any impairment of 
capital noted in the audit and recommendations for the return of 
such Government capital or the payment of such dividends as, in his 
judgment, should be accomplished. The report shall also show 
specifically any program, expenditure, or other financial transaction 
238. See note 188 supra. Though the Act does not on its face give the Comptroller 
General authority to disallow such expenditures, it is not altogether clear that he 
would not claim such authority under appropriate circumstances, as the TV A-GAO 
dispute demonstrated. 
239. See, e.g., Beach, Role of the General Accounting Office in the Regulation of 
Industry, 21 Bus. LAw. 235 (1965). 
240. See H. MANSFIELD, THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL 267-77 (1939); Pritchett, The 
Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, 40 AM. Pot. Ser. REV. 495, 502-05 (1946). 
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or undertaking observed in the course of the audit, which, in the 
opinion of the Comptroller General, has been carried on or made 
without authority of law.241 
Experience with General Accounting Office audits, albeit by govern-
ment departments under the settlement authority,242 suggests that the 
Comptroller General will stop at nothing in searching out details of 
possible illegality or inefficiency, and that his audits are not intended 
to indicate those aspects of operations that have been conducted 
efficiently. Why audit by the General Accounting Office was specified 
in the Government Corporation Control Act is difficult to understand 
except as a means for exercising control, since the Office's primary 
experience is with legality audits pursuant to departmental appropria-
tions.243 
Essential to an effective reform, therefore, is a business-type 
budget not keyed to appropriation headings and not subject to de-
tailed modification by Congress in the absence of some showing of 
public interest. Clear exclusion from the disallowance authority of 
the Comptroller General244 is similarly essential. Audit by inde-
pendent certified public accountants, though perhaps desirable, can 
safely be foregone if the other protections listed above are assured. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Evidence of the need for reorganizing the Post Office Department 
is abundant. Without meaningful improvements, the Department 
will experience increasing difficulty in performing its job of deliver-
ing the mails. It should be made quite clear that no miracles will 
stem from the changes. There is substantial evidence to prove the 
obvious conclusion that the effects of changes in organizations are 
felt only after significant passage of time.245 Moreover, the issue now 
is not whether the Post Office ,rill suddenly be made a vigorous model 
of governmental efficiency, but rather whether reorganization can 
equip the Post Office to deal with the problems of the future. 
It was noted earlier that incorporation of the Post Office of itself 
would have little importance. It should now be evident that the 
241. 31 u.s.c. § 851 (1964). 
242. See text accompanying note 158 supra. 
243. Audit by a firm of independent certified public accountants would bring ob-
jectivity and commercial experience to the examination. This, however, is precluded 
by the Government Corporation Control Act. 31 U.S.C. § 866(d) (1964). See note 161 
supra. 
244. 31 u.s.c. §§ 71, 74 (1964). 
245. See, e.g., R. LIKERT, THE HUMAN ORGANIZATION 78-100 (1967). 
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absence in any reorganization plan of certain critical elements, though 
it may not render the plan entirely useless, will leave major impedi-
ments to the effective operation of the postal system. Reorganization 
of the postal system as a corporation can have important symbolic 
significance; it can represent a break with the past and a genuine at-
tempt to infuse operations with new ideas. I make no pretense that 
the proposed plan will not encounter major political roadblocks, but 
if critical features are compromised now, the chance to remake the 
Post Office may be lost for generations. And if a corporation is estab-
lished without some genuine elements of autonomy, the effect may 
be to perpetuate long-standing abuses in the name of reform. 
